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 In the past fifteen years, urban universities have become increasingly active as 
commercial real estate developers. Universities have begun to acquire, renovate, or develop from 
the ground floor significant tracts of commercial property near their campuses. Often these 
investments are accompanied by management policies inspired by shopping center developers, 
with tenants carefully chosen, the details of operation such as opening hours specified by 
contract, and public goods provided either by the university or through university-controlled 
organizations. While the activities of some universities, notably the University of Pennsylvania, 
have been extensively documented, no published study exists of Yale’s extensive program to 
improve New Haven through investment in and careful management of commercial real estate. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, Yale has become a major player in New Haven commercial real 
estate, emerging as the city’s largest commercial landlord, with approximately ninety retail 
tenants. In this paper, I will both describe Yale’s commercial real estate program and assess the 
success of this program, both from the internal perspective of whether Yale has met its goals and 
the external perspective of its effects on New Haven residents.  
 I begin by providing an overview of university development practices. In the 1950s and 
1960s, urban universities participated extensively in federal, state, and local urban renewal 
programs in order to improve the quality of surrounding neighborhoods and protect the long-
term health of their institutions. But as public enthusiasm for urban renewal waned, many 
universities found that their aggressive clearance had made them the target of significant 
community resentment. After these events, universities got out of the urban development game 
for several decades. In the past fifteen or twenty years, however, a number of urban universities 




cities more generally. These programs have coalesced around a certain model, with active 
management of commercial real estate playing a very large role in these modern efforts. 
 Next, I discuss three behavioral models of university investment in commercial real 
estate. The first of these sees universities as simply private developers, taking advantage of 
certain institutional competencies to maximize the returns on their commercial investments. The 
second model sees universities as investors with a broader focus. Because universities have 
enormous, concentrated, and essentially fixed investments in often-deteriorating urban 
communities, it may be rational for them to make secondary real estate investments that are 
direct money losers if those investments sufficiently increase the returns on their existing 
investments by enhancing the university appeal for potential students and faculty. Finally, I 
introduce the possibility that universities should be seen as political institutions with their 
policies shaped by typical political dynamics. As a result, we should expect the most powerful 
and organized groups within the university community to tilt policy toward their own best 
interests at the expense of other, less-organized stakeholders.  
 In Part 3, I discuss Yale’s practices in detail. This begins with a brief history of the 
establishment of Yale’s program and the acquisition of its properties, which fall into three main 
areas. I then turn to Yale’s current institutional structure for managing its program. Finally, I 
catalogue a number of notable practices and a few specific incidents that will help us to 
understand what Yale is trying to do and whether it has been successful. 
 I then attempt to explain the data of Part 3 with the theories introduced in Part 2. The goal 
of Part 4 is positivistic: to understand Yale’s purposes and goals based on its observed behavior 
rather than relying on official statements of the University’s objectives. This Part begins with an 




for the most part behaves exactly as a private developer would, which lends support to this 
model of Yale’s activities. However, this model is unable to explain some prominent features of 
Yale’s program. While the second model, Yale as a secondary investor, accounts for some of 
these deficiencies, it too falls short. Instead, Yale’s behavior is best explained using the political 
institution model, as we see evidence that Yale’s policies favor those members of the Yale 
community who can most easily organize to shape policy toward their needs. Yale’s program is 
also the victim of several serious agency problems. Thus while Yale’s program is generally 
successful at meeting its goals of improving the quality of life for its affiliates, its policies depart 
from what would be optimal in several consistent ways. These dysfunctional features of Yale’s 
program are so far relatively minor, but probably cannot be corrected, suggesting that as Yale’s 
real estate investments expand they will become less and less efficient.  
 Finally, in Part 5 I attempt to assess Yale’s program from an external perspective: have 
the University’s activities improved New Haven as a whole? Adopting a utilitarian approach, I 
argue that Yale’s program is likely to depart from what is socially optimal in a systematic way 
because the different interests of the Yale community and New Haven residents impose unequal 
transaction costs on certain groups of New Haveners. The basic dynamic is reminiscent of 
exclusionary zoning, which may be the best model for conceiving of the possible harms created 
by Yale’s program. Because Yale and other urban universities are becoming increasingly active 
in urban development—that is, they are acting to meet the needs of affiliates in new ways that 
are not traditionally seen as part of the university’s mission—they risk repeating many of the 
mistakes of 1950s urban renewal, only in the name of today’s accepted theories of urban 
development. The harms created by Yale’s program are so far minor given its relatively small 




significant costs on non-affiliates and creating community backlash. Finally, I conclude this Part 
with an alternative critique, questioning whether importing the development strategies of 
shopping centers to urban development is a good idea. Such practices may deprive the city of 
many of the virtues urbanists prize, notably its vitality and micro diversity.  
1. AN OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSITY URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Histories of universities’ urban development present a common story.1 In these accounts, 
the rapid rise in college attendance following World War II led many universities to expand 
aggressively to meet this greater demand. At the same time, suburbanization and the decline of 
urban areas prompted many urban universities to become active participants in urban renewal 
efforts, particularly the federal urban renewal program, in order to improve the quality of their 
surrounding neighborhoods and to maintain the appeal of the university area. As with the federal 
urban renewal program generally, the heavy-handed, top-down, and somewhat elitist nature of 
universities’ activities led to severe community backlash in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For 
the next few decades, urban universities’ expansion and development plans were stymied by 
newly powerful community groups. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, universities had learned 
the error of their ways and adopted more-collaborative approaches to meeting their institutional 
goals that involved local communities in university planning and decisionmaking. With these 
new institutional structures, as well as the insights of Jane Jacobs and her followers, universities 
have developed new programs to meet their needs for expansion and to improve their 
communities that avoid the mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s. This latter goal of spurring urban 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., JUDITH RODIN, THE UNIVERSITY & URBAN REVIVAL: OUT OF THE IVORY TOWER AND INTO THE STREETS 
23-44 (2007); Sabina Deitrick & Tracy Soska, The University of Pittsburgh and the Oakland Neighborhood: From 
Conflict to Cooperation, or How the 800-Pound Gorilla Learned To Sit with—and not on—Its Neighbors, in THE 
UNIVERSITY AS URBAN DEVELOPER: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 25 (David C. Perry & Wim Wiewel eds., 2005); 
Henry S. Webber, The University of Chicago and Its Neighbors: A Case Study in Community Development, in THE 




revival has become a major priority at many urban universities, which have adopted a particular 
model of university urban development that focuses on improving public safety and schools and 
investing in housing and commercial real estate. 
In this Part, I will present this general history in more depth, beginning with universities’ 
activities in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly their involvement in urban renewal programs.
2
 I 
then turn to the humbling of the once-mighty universities in the 1970s, when the power of 
community groups increased and many universities’ expansion and development plans failed. 
Finally, I will provide an overview of current university practices, looking in particular at three 
major innovators: the University of Chicago, Columbia University, and the University of 
Pennsylvania.  
1.1 Postwar Expansion and Urban Renewal 
Following World War II, many universities embarked on aggressive programs to expand 
and to improve their neighborhoods. Many universities had been slowly expanding for decades 
before the mid-Twentieth Century.
3
 But the 1950s saw two demographic trends that prompted 
greater activity. First, the end of the war and the G.I. Bill led to a rapid increase in college 
enrollment.
4
 Many colleges and universities chose to expand their facilities in order to take 
advantage of this greater demand for college education.   
Second, the postwar era saw enormous growth in the suburbs, accompanied by urban 
deterioration.
5
 This suburban growth led to absolute declines in population in many central cities 
                                                 
2 Of course, universities cared about the quality of their communities long before the mid Twentieth Century. I begin 
with this period both because it marked more-involved efforts in this area and because it provides useful lessons for 
current practices.  
3 Yale University was somewhat of an outlier, as its major period of expansion occurred in the 1930s, with most of 
its major land acquisitions occurring long before this.  
4 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 at tbl. 
Bc523-536 (rev. ed. 2006). As these statistics show, enrollment growth was relatively consistent from 1900 until the 
mid-1950s, at which point the rate of growth increased significantly and permanently.  




between 1950 and 1970.
6
 These cities also saw significant demographic changes, as white 
residents departing for the suburbs were replaced by blacks migrating from the South in search 
of better-paying manufacturing jobs in the Northeast and Midwest.
7
 These trends meant that the 
neighborhoods surrounding many urban universities very quickly changed from middle- or 
upper-class white neighborhoods to integrated neighborhoods with lower per capita incomes. 
The University of Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhood is a notable example: between 
1950 and 1956, its black population grew from 4,300 to 30,000, while the white population 
declined from 67,000 to 47,000.
8
 Chicago administrators worried that these changes would make 
it more difficult to recruit students and faculty, threatening the long-term success of the 
University.
9
 Thus at the University of Chicago and elsewhere, university administrators searched 
for ways to improve their surrounding neighborhoods.  
These twin goals of expansion to meet greater demand and investment to improve 
university surroundings made universities natural participants in cities’ and the federal 
government’s urban renewal programs. At first, universities’ partnerships with cities were 
initiated by the universities themselves. For example, in 1958, the University of Chicago 
developed an urban renewal plan for 885 acres, which included clearing 101.2 acres, and secured 
from the city the use of its eminent domain power.
10
 Similar efforts were underway at the 
University of Pennsylvania in the mid-1950s.
11
 The 1950s excitement for urban renewal made 
cities more than willing to cooperate with universities by granting them eminent domain power 
and tailoring public urban renewal plans to meet universities’ needs. 
                                                 
6 Id. at 110, tbl. 1.  
7 Id. at 115.  
8 Webber, supra note 1, at 68-69.  
9 Id. at 69.  
10 Id. at 70.  




This partnership between universities and municipalities received an enormous boost in 
1959 with that year’s amendments to federal urban renewal legislation. Under the federal 
renewal program, the federal government made grants to municipalities for specified urban 
renewal projects.
12
 These grants were made in the form of matching funds, with one-third of the 
cost of the urban renewal project supplied by the municipality in which the project was located 
and the remaining two-thirds of the cost supplied by the federal government.
13
 In 1959, however, 
due to the lobbying of several cities and urban universities, including New Haven and the 
University of Chicago, federal legislation was amended to permit municipalities to include the 
private expenditures of colleges or universities made within an urban renewal project’s 
boundaries as part of the municipality’s one-third contribution.14 This provision was even 




These amendments to federal law increased university involvement in urban renewal in 
two ways. First, it gave cities greater incentives to locate urban renewal projects in the vicinity of 
universities, since only then could the universities’ private expenditures increase the amount of 
federal funding available for a project.
16
 Second, it made cities more willing to assist 
universities’ expenditure of funds by exercising eminent domain on the universities’ behalf, 
rezoning land, etc. Unsurprisingly, following the 1959 amendments to federal urban renewal 
                                                 
12 The literature on the federal urban renewal program is vast and discussing the program in detail is unnecessary to 
the purposes of this paper. For a helpful overview of the structure of the legislation and its early evolution, see 
Ashley A. Foard & Hilbert Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 635 
(1960).  
13 ALLAN R. TALBOT, THE MAYOR’S GAME: RICHARD LEE OF NEW HAVEN AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE 153 
(1970).  
14 Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 677 (1959); see TALBOT, supra note 13, at 156; Foard & Fefferman, supra note 12, at 
680-81.  
15 Foard & Fefferman, supra note 12, at 681.  
16 As Talbot notes, universities lobbied for this provision precisely so that cities would plan urban renewal projects 
in the area of universities, allowing the university to leverage its own expenditures with federal funds to enhance the 




legislation, the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania expanded their existing 
programs to include new areas,
17
 while new universities, including Columbia University and St. 
Louis University, got in on the action.
18
 These projects mostly consisted of clearing “blighted” 
buildings in the area and replacing them with new university buildings. But not all land acquired 
and cleared for urban renewal was used for new university facilities. In keeping with their 
ambitions to improve the quality of surrounding neighborhoods, many of the more-ambitious 
universities, notably Chicago, Columbia, and Penn, also erected apartment buildings, 
townhouses, and commercial space, which was then either sold to private owners or managed by 
the university as an investment.
19
  
It is worth noting that Yale was less involved in urban renewal than many of its peers, 
particularly relative to New Haven’s ambitious efforts. With the notable exception of the Oak 
Street project, which was planned and carried out long before the 1959 amendments to federal 
legislation made catering to universities a priority, none of New Haven’s urban renewal projects 
were placed in areas that would particularly benefit Yale.
20
 Moreover, New Haven never 
exercised eminent domain on behalf of Yale, unlike the governments of many other cities with 
major urban universities. These facts are likely due to New Haven politics, as Mayor Dick Lee 
suffered some backlash for appearing too favorable to Yale in a pre-urban renewal episode 
involving the sale of city schools.
21
 To avoid similar political opposition, Mayor Lee changed his 
                                                 
17 See RODIN, supra note 1, at 33-36 (discussing the University of Pennsylvania); Webber, supra note 1, at 68-71 
(discussing the University of Chicago).  
18 See Sarah Cummings et al., University Involvement in Downtown Revitalization, in THE UNIVERSITY AS URBAN 
DEVELOPER, supra note 1, at 147, 166-67; Peter Marcuse & Cuz Potter, Columbia University’s Heights: An Ivory 
Tower and Its Communities, in THE UNIVERSITY AS URBAN DEVELOPER, supra note 1, at 45, 48-49.  
19 See Marcuse & Potter, supra note 18, at 48-49; Webber, supra note 1, at 70-73.  
20 Yale’s expenditures on Ezra Stiles and Morse Colleges were included as part of the city’s costs for the Dixwell 
renewal project, but unlike projects in other cities, it is doubtful that the Dixwell project was planned to benefit 
Yale. See DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END 322 (2003); TALBOT, supra note 13, at 156-57. Rather, 
the fact that the University’s expenditures could benefit the city’s project was just good fortune. 




initial plans to sell a large parcel cleared as part of the Oak Street project to Yale, instead holding 
an auction in which Yale was (unexpectedly) outbid.
22
 As a result of these political forces, Yale 
was a smaller player in New Haven’s urban renewal program than were Chicago, Penn, and 
Columbia. Instead, Yale’s interest in expansion and neighborhood improvement would need to 
be met through voluntary transfers of land.  
1.2 Backlash 
Universities’ use of urban renewal to improve their surroundings quickly died for the 
same reasons 1960s-style urban renewal died, but with the additional result that resentment over 
universities’ activities in the 1960s was long-lasting, leading to significant community opposition 
to almost any efforts by universities to expand their facilities or invest in surrounding areas. 
Discussing the failures of the federal urban renewal program is far outside the scope of this 
paper, but scholars generally recognize that urban renewal projects were often poorly planned, 
undemocratic, did not respond to market demand, imposed disproportionate costs on poorer 
displaced residents, and were based on fundamentally unsound visions of what cities should look 
like.
23
 Many of these same complaints apply to universities’ efforts to improve their communities 
through clearance: they were an example of a top-down, hyper-planned effort at transformation 
that imposed enormous costs on nearby, mostly poor, residents in order to benefit wealthier 
universities and their affiliates.  
It should hardly be surprising, then, that universities’ growing involvement in urban 
renewal was controversial and spurred political opposition in many cities. Columbia University 
is a well-known example. In 1968, its plans for expansion through clearance came to an abrupt 
                                                 
22 Id. at 78-80. 




halt following protests by community members and students.
24
 Chicago’s and Penn’s aggressive 
renewal programs came to a similar end, as neighborhood groups became increasingly powerful 
in municipal politics. 
Political and community resistance to urban universities’ expansion and investment plans 
lasted long past their interest in using 1960s-style urban renewal. Many universities found their 
efforts to build new facilities stymied for decades. The University of Pittsburgh, for example, 
developed a series of plans for expansion into the surrounding neighborhood during the 1960s 
and 1970s, only to meet implacable opposition that forced modification or abandonment of many 
of the University’s more ambitious ideas.25 Yale experienced similar setbacks in the early 1970s, 
as its plans to build two new residential colleges on land it already owned, a proposal that likely 
would have been swiftly approved by the Lee administration just a decade earlier, was killed by 
political opposition over diminished tax revenue.
26
 In response to these setbacks, universities 
scaled back the scope of their expansion plans, focusing more on upgrading facilities on land 
already owned and used by the university than on acquiring non-university land. And from the 
collapse of urban renewal in the 1960s until the mid-1990s, no university, with the exception of 
the University of Chicago and Columbia, seems to have taken any significant steps to improve 
the quality of its surrounding neighborhoods. Such ambitions were a casualty of universities’ 
previous mistakes.  
1.3 Universities’ Responses 
As universities recognized that the political power they had enjoyed in the 1950s and 
1960s had vanished and was unlikely to return, they responded primarily by developing new 
                                                 
24 Marcuse & Potter, supra note 18, at 49. 
25 Deitrick & Soska, supra note 1, at 28-32. 
26 See RAE, supra note 20, at 427-31. The land in question was occupied by commercial space and thus was subject 




institutional approaches. Case studies, such as those collected in The University as Urban 
Developer,
27
 tell of how various universities developed collaborative approaches that included 
community groups in university plans for expansion and development.
28
 Judith Rodin, former 
President of the University of Pennsylvania, tells a similar story, as Penn administrators in the 
1980s and 1990s (before Rodin’s time as President) established various fora for planning and 




While sources such as these are unfortunately vague on the details, they allow us draw 
some useful insights into what lessons university administrators have and have not learned from 
universities’ previous efforts to redevelop and renew their communities. Specifically, 
administrators at schools such as Penn, Chicago, and no doubt Yale,
30
 view the failure of these 
programs as due to two factors. First, many of these plans were based on simply erroneous 
theories about what made urban areas successful. Clearing existing land and replacing it with 
modern buildings in the park, based on the visions of Le Corbusier, harmed rather than helped 
the areas targeted for improvement.
31
 Second, universities’ plans for urban improvement were 
the result of flawed processes. These plans were developed largely in secrecy by high-level 
administrators and academics, ceremoniously announced to the community, and then acted 
                                                 
27 Supra note 1. The studies in this collection were written primarily by university administrators and planning 
professors and directed toward an audience of the same.  
28 See, e.g., Deitrick & Soska, supra note 1, at 33-42; Elizabeth Strom, The Political Strategies Behind University-
Based Development: Two Philadelphia Cases, in THE UNIVERSITY AS URBAN DEVELOPER, supra note 1, at 116. 
29 RODIN, supra note 1. 
30 Apparently a case study on Yale was prepared for The University as Urban Developer, but it was withdrawn due 
to “confidentiality concerns.” Wim Wiewel & David C. Perry, Ivory Towers No More: Academic Bricks and Sticks, 
in THE UNIVERSITY AS URBAN DEVELOPER, supra note 1, at 300, 305. On Yale’s general secrecy regarding its 
program, see infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined., 128-132 and accompanying text, and 188. 
31 See, e.g., RODIN, supra note 1, at 38. The influence of Jane Jacobs on Rodin’s plans for Penn in the 1990s is made 






 The lack of community involvement in university planning spawned political opposition 
and may even have diminished the quality of university plans. 
Fortunately for universities’ self-image, the literature suggests that today’s administrators 
see these deficiencies as cured by modern practices. Not only have universities learned the 
lessons of Jane Jacobs and the New Urbanists,
33
 they have also learned the value of working with 
their communities.
34
 But the universities’ needs, particularly the importance of improving 
surrounding areas to ensure the long-term success of the university, are if anything even more 
pressing today.
35
 Thus with better processes and better theory, universities are finally equipped 
to realize some of the ambitions that animated their participation in urban renewal during the 
1950s and 1960s.  
 These self-histories of university development written by current administrators and 
planners are perhaps most surprising for one theme they entirely lack. On their view, the policies 
that benefit the university will also benefit the community. Thus universities’ present activities 
consist solely of Pareto superior moves. I will return to this issue later in this paper,
36
 but for now 
it is enough to note the curious fact that no doubt much like their predecessors in the 1950s and 
1960s, today’s university administrators regard reversing urban deterioration as essentially a 
problem to be solved by wise technocrats. There is no hint that urban universities and the 
residents of the central cities surrounding them may have fundamentally different interests, that 
this makes the university a poor institution for achieving broad social change, and that this 
deficiency may in part explain the failure of universities mid-century urban renewal programs.   
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Deitrick & Soska, supra note 1, at 28-32.  
33 See, e.g., RODIN, supra note 1, at 20-21 (discussing the influence of New Urbanists on Penn’s plans).  
34 See id. at 21-22.  
35 See id. at 3-11.  




1.4 Modern Practices 
Today, many universities are engaged in programs to revive their communities as 
ambitious as those of the post-war era. Describing universities’ present activities in detail would 
be far beyond the scope of this paper, but in order to better understand Yale’s program, it is 
helpful to have a general sense of what Yale’s peers are doing, particularly since university 
practices are quite similar. This similarity is surely not an accident—these universities have 
clearly learned from their peers—and this process of imitation has created a standard model of 
development. This model consists of four components: improving public safety, increasing the 
quality of housing, investing in commercial real estate, and assisting local schools. I will provide 
some detail regarding the efforts of two other universities that contributed significantly to 
developing this model, the University of Chicago and Columbia University, before briefly 
discussing the University of Pennsylvania’s program, perhaps the best, or at least best-
publicized, example of modern university practices.
37
 
1.4.1 The University of Chicago 
The University of Chicago was one of the few universities to maintain a significant 
program for improving its surrounding neighborhood, Hyde Park-Kenwood, following the 
collapse of urban renewal.
38
 It was also a key innovator, developing several programs that have 
been widely copied. The most important of these was the establishment of a university police 
force. This force began in 1968 when, following a crime wave in Hyde Park, the University 
reached an agreement with the City that enabled the existing campus security force to become a 
                                                 
37 Yale’s program, while different from Penn in many details, is a serious rival to Penn’s program in terms of scope, 
and given the relative size of New Haven and Philadelphia has arguably had a greater effect on its city. I will 
mention important differences between Yale’s and Penn’s programs, particularly in the area of commercial real 
estate, this paper’s focus, throughout the remainder of this paper.  
38 It is clear, however, that even though Chicago continued in its efforts to enhance the quality of Hyde Park-
Kenwood, these efforts were greatly reduced from those it made during the 1950s and 1960s. Webber, supra note 1, 




fully licensed police department within the Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhood.
39
 University 
police forces have since become the norm at urban universities.  
The University also maintained a more-active role in real estate than its peers. In the early 
1980s, it acquired and renovated a deteriorating shopping center in Hyde Park that had been built 
during urban renewal, in part to ensure that university affiliates would have access to stores that 
would appeal to them.
40
 The success of this program led the University to acquire additional 
commercial property near its campus for similar purposes.
41
 Throughout this period, Chicago 
maintained a program aimed at “problem buildings,” purchasing residential housing that was in 
serious violation of housing codes and renovating it for student or staff housing.
42
 As a result, by 
the late 1990s, the University owned nearly 2,000 units dedicated to graduate student, faculty, 
and staff housing.
43
 The University also played a minor role in several residential development 
projects aimed at providing housing to non-university affiliates.
44
 Although modest compared 
with the present day programs of Yale or Penn, these efforts clearly served as a model for other 
universities’ real estate investments.45 
1.4.2 Columbia University 
Columbia University was also a major innovator, particularly in the area of real estate. 
The University had acquired significant land in the 1960s, intending to clear much of it and build 
new university facilities. But this plan was disrupted by student protests and community 
opposition, leaving the University with significant holdings of existing commercial and 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 75.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 73.  
45 Today, the University of Chicago has expanded its efforts to include the sort of full-scale development projects 






 For more than a decade, the University managed these properties more or less 
like a normal landlord, with its goal being to achieve investment-grade returns.
47
 
In 1982, Columbia developed a new plan, both for managing its current holdings and for 
future expansion, which had four important features. First, the plan recommended a “deck of 
playing cards” approach in which the University quickly purchased any potentially useful 
properties that became available and then considered how these properties could be used to best 
meet the University’s needs.48 Second, the plan proposed managing existing properties with an 
eye toward the University’s broader interests.49 This meant, in part, accepting lower rents from 
tenants whose businesses would provide goods and services desired by university affiliates, 
thereby contributing to an atmosphere that would help the university draw top faculty and 
students. Finally, the plan recommended various streetscape improvements on major streets 
surrounding campus and providing assistance to local property owners to expand or renovate 
their properties.
50
 This plan was gradually implemented in the 1980s and 1990s.
51
 In order to 
meet the University’s second goal, tenants for commercial properties were carefully selected 
based in part on surveys of University affiliates.
52
 While I have found no evidence that other 
universities were consciously influenced by Columbia’s program in the 1980s, these four aspects 
of Columbia’s 1982 plan have much in common with some of the key features of real-estate 
development efforts at other urban universities, notably Penn and Yale, more than a decade later.  
                                                 
46 See Marcuse & Potter, supra note 18, at 49.  
47 Id. at 50.  
48 Id. Previously, the University had used the opposite practice: developing plans and then seeking to purchase 
buildings to implement them.  
49 Id. at 50-51.  






1.4.3  The University of Pennsylvania 
The University of Pennsylvania has not only incorporated many of the innovations of 
other universities, such as Chicago’s university police force and Columbia’s management of 
commercial real estate to suit the university’s broader interests, but it has also developed a few of 
its own. Further, Penn’s program is useful to study both historically and in comparison with 
Yale’s for three reasons. First, Penn’s program contains all the elements of the modern university 
development model. To my knowledge, there is no common practice among universities aimed 
at improving their surroundings that is not found in Penn’s program. Second, Penn’s investments 
in West Philadelphia and Philadelphia as a whole are unsurpassed, with the possible exception of 
Yale.
53
 Finally, Penn has been quite public regarding its program of urban development, 
providing many details regarding its activities and the thinking behind them.
54
 This means that 
getting a general sense of Penn’s program is much easier than for many other universities, 
including Yale. 
Penn’s program to improve West Philadelphia began in 1996 following the well-
publicized murder of a Penn biochemist and several other major criminal incidents involving 
university affiliates.
55
 In response, Judith Rodin, who had recently become the University’s new 
president, began developing plans for improving West Philadelphia and the safety and appeal of 
Penn. These plans focused on five areas: public safety, residential housing, commercial activity, 
                                                 
53 This is necessarily a rough qualitative rather than a quantitative assessment, since no university publishes much in 
the way of figures regarding their spending on these programs. See also Katie DeWitt, Many Universities Face 
Town-Gown Issues, THE YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2005), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2005/mar/29/many-universities-face-town-gown-issues/ (quoting Yale 
Professor Douglas Rae as saying that Penn is the only school “decidedly more ambitious” than Yale in community 
outreach).  
54 Of course, much of this information comes from Penn administrators, notably its former President, Judith Rodin, 
who made improving the Penn campus and West Philadelphia a priority of her tenure. There are obvious perils in 
relying too much on these accounts. As such, my discussion of Penn’s program should not be taken as a completely 
accurate description of what Penn is actually doing it, why it is doing it, or what effects it had on West Philadelphia, 
but rather as a rough account of the priorities of Penn administrators and their public justification of these steps.  




economic development, and public schools.
56
 Penn decided early on to implement these 
initiatives itself, rather than to allow community groups to manage them with Penn’s input and 
money.
57
 To ensure these measures remained a priority, Rodin appointed a new executive vice 
president to manage day-to-day activities,
58
 and a number of institutional changes were made, 
such as relocating offices within Penn’s bureaucratic structure, to ensure that responsibility for 
the program would be concentrated under this vice president.
59
 
It is unnecessary to go into great detail regarding Penn’s program, particularly in areas 
other than commercial real estate, but I will provide a brief overview to give a sense of the 
program. To improve public safety, Penn increased the number of campus and city police 
patrols, invested in lighting, worked to eliminate graffiti and other “broken windows,”  
established several neighborhood  associations including a special services district funded mostly 
by the university, and expanded its shuttle service.
60
 Penn’s housing program focused on 
purchasing, rehabilitating, and selling vacant housing; expanding its existing mortgage-guarantee 
program for university affiliates; and acquiring and renovating rental housing for both affiliates 
and non-affiliates of the University.
61
 Penn’s investments in local public schools were perhaps its 
most-ambitious set of measures, but these are too complex to summarize here.
62
 
Like Columbia before it and, as I discuss later in this paper, Yale, a major component of 
Penn’s plans to improve West Philadelphia was investment in and management of commercial 
                                                 
56 Id. at 22.  
57 Id. at 46.  
58 Id. at 48.  
59 See, e.g., id. at 51.  
60 Id. at 59-80.  
61 Id. at 81-106. Rodin reports that the University was willing to tolerate below investment grade returns on many of 
these projects and outright lost money rehabilitating vacant housing. Id. at 88, 95. Interestingly, the organization 
Penn created to develop residential housing has occasionally exercised eminent domain powers. Id. at 97.  






 Penn evaluated potential real-estate investments with an eye toward two 
considerations: what types of retail would attract the most buying power and what retail would 
best reinforce “campus-neighborhood linkage.”64 These considerations led Penn to commit 
substantial resources, redeveloping two areas into new commercial centers with major retail 
anchors, with a hope of gradually reducing its participation as private investment in the area 
grew.
65
 The first of these projects, Sansom Common, a $95 million mixed-use development built 
on a former parking lot and anchored by a new Barnes & Noble operating as Penn’s bookstore, 
opened in 1999.
66
 Penn’s second major project, 40th Street, was a $40 million mixed-use 
development with a large grocery store, a movie theater, and a public library as its anchors. This 
project encountered numerous delays, with some stores opening in 2000 and final completion in 
2004.
67
 Penn, apparently advised by the New Urbanist Andres Duany, carefully selected tenants 
for these developments in order to generate an appealing mix of businesses, much as shopping 
center developers do.
68
 In this process, Penn made extensive use of focus groups and surveys 
both of university affiliates and non-affiliates.
69
 In all of these measures, Penn was again willing 
to accept returns below those provided by ordinary endowment investments.
70
 
Penn’s program, both in commercial real estate and other areas, demonstrates the full 
range of present university urban development activities. As mentioned, these programs typically 
focus on four main areas: public safety, housing, commercial real estate, and education. In 
                                                 
63 Much like Columbia, Penn’s real-estate development efforts were greatly aided by the fact that it had acquired but 
never developed significant tracts of land during urban renewal. See Strom, supra note 28, at 120. 
64 RODIN, supra note 1, at 108-09. This latter term is not well defined, but in context suggests building retail that 
would appeal to students, faculty, and the community at large.  
65 Id. at 109. Rodin does not explain precisely what this means. I interpret this statement as indicating not that Penn 
had intended to sell off its real estate but rather instead planned to invest a lot of money now in new projects in order 
to spur private investment, but would not invest much in the future.  
66 Id. at 114-19. 
67 Id. at 119-29.  
68 Id. at 127-28.  
69 Id. at 110.  




commercial real estate, some universities undertake entirely new developments, while others 
primarily rehabilitate existing real estate. These projects are frequently managed much like 
modern shopping centers, with careful tenant selection and an emphasis on attracting appealing 
anchor tenants. Finally, projects are often developed with an eye toward creating favorable 
externalities that will be captured both by the University itself and the surrounding 
neighborhood. This sort of approach is what I have in mind when I mention the general model of 
current university development. While universities differ greatly in the details, these basic 
features are found in development programs at Columbia, Chicago, Penn, Brown, Ohio State, 
and Case Western, to name just a few. Keeping this general model in mind will be useful when I 
discuss Yale’s own commercial real-estate program in detail.  
2. THREE THEORIES OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOR 
Before introducing Yale’s program of urban revitalization through commercial real estate 
investment, I want to consider the question of why universities would invest in commercial real 
estate at all. In this paper, I will consider three models of university behavior, which I will call 
the university as private developer, the university as secondary investor, and the university as 
political institution. These theories are not only useful to explain why universities would invest in 
commercial real estate in the first place; they also produce different predictions regarding what 
sort of investments universities will make. It is important to note at the outset that in practice, 
distinguishing which model best explains a particular university’s behavior may be difficult, 
since in many cases the three models will recommend the same action. Further, as I will shortly 
argue, the three models should be seen along a continuum of behavior, meaning that a university 




using one model, while in other areas, different institutional dynamics result in another model 
being more persuasive.    
2.1 The University as Private Developer 
Universities have several traits that may make them successful as private developers. 
First, many universities have access to considerable amounts of capital.
71
 This would allow them 
to invest in projects that many private real estate developers could not. Because private 
developers often must obtain significant financing for their projects, they may be unable to invest 
in ventures that will generate significant returns but only far down the road.
72
 Universities do not 
face these constraints because they can invest their own capital. Universities also have a good 
knowledge of the local community, and, if they are to be successful at attracting students, must 
know something about the interests of demographic groups that many retailers target. Further, 
because universities usually operate within one community for a long time, they are likely to 
have strong preexisting ties both to community organizations and government. This may render 
the zoning and permit approval processes easier than they would be for private developers, who 
may lack these prior ties to government officials.
73
 And because the university, government, and 
community groups are repeat players, they may have incentives to get along and be able to 
engage in greater logrolling and deal-making than ordinary private developers. Finally, 
universities, particularly elite universities, produce many powerful and highly skilled graduates 
                                                 
71 At the end of fiscal year 2009, Yale valued its endowment at $16.3 billion. YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS 
OFFICE, THE YALE ENDOWMENT 2009 at i (2009), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/investments/Yale_Endowment_09.pdf. Given universities’ long time horizons, much of their 
endowments are in illiquid investments, but clearly they have significant resources for investing in real estate if they 
should choose to do so.  
72 For a brief overview of real estate financing, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 20-24 (3d ed. 2005).  
73 Of course, this is not necessarily so. Long-standing hostility to or resentment against a university from its prior 




who feel a special bond with their alma mater. Universities thus may be able to benefit from the 
favors and human capital of its graduates at below-market rates.  
Descriptively, the university as private developer model predicts that universities will act 
in the same way as an ordinary private developer would. This model would explain a university’s 
behavior when that university engages in practices that are common among successful private 
developers and make economic sense for such investors. The model would be falsified if we find 
a university behaving unlike a private developer by taking certain actions a private developer 
would deem economically irrational. Thus using this model to explain university behavior first 
requires that we have a sense of what sort of decisions an ordinary private developer with land 
holdings similar to a university’s would make. I will consider how a private developer who held 
the properties Yale holds might manage these properties later in this paper in order to assess the 
explanatory power of this model in the Yale case.
74
 As an initial statement, however, it suffices 
to note that the manner in which one property is used may affect nearby properties. Thus private 
developers with significant and condensed holdings will consider how renting space to a 
particular tenant may enhance or impair the value of their nearby properties. Private developers 
will seek to maximize the value of their properties as a whole rather than maximizing income on 
a property-by-property basis. If a university acquires concentrated properties, this model of 
behavior would expect them to be sensitive to the same dynamic.   
2.2 The University as Secondary Investor 
The university as private developer model assumed that universities were rational 
investors in a narrow sense. That is, universities maximize the economic returns on their real 
estate investments in the same way as a private developer would. The university as secondary 
investor model begins with this same assumption—universities are rational investors—but with 
                                                 




an added element: unlike an ordinary private developer, whose primary activity is real estate, 
universities are primarily engaged in education. Thus unlike the private developer, who needs 
only to consider how his or her properties may affect each other, the rational university might 
also consider how its investments in secondary areas may affect the success of its primary 
activity. This means that certain secondary investments that are locally unsound—that is, they 
produce lower gains than opportunity costs—may be globally prudent if they sufficiently 
improve the return to the university’s primary activity.  
To flesh this out, consider the plight of the urban university. Universities such as Yale 
have made substantial investments in their cities, often for centuries. These primary investments 
are fundamentally illiquid. Few private parties have a use for, say, a residential college or a 
university library, so the market value of these investments is likely much lower than their value 
to the university. This means that universities simply cannot cash out their investments and build 
a new campus elsewhere without significant economic loss. It is hardly surprising, then, that 
established universities (at least in the current day) never move: the size of their prior 
investments makes this impossible absent extraordinary circumstances.
75
 In addition, universities 
tend to be physically concentrated in a campus. Because of this, they will inevitably capture 
many of the good and bad externalities created by surrounding land uses.
76
  
The success or failure of universities’ illiquid investments is largely the result of their 
ability to attract high-quality students and faculty. Appealing to the former ensures that the 
university can charge higher tuition, since it means that demand to attend is high,
77
 while hauling 
                                                 
75 This, when combined with first-mover advantages and the enormous cost of creating new elite universities, means 
that the placement of elite universities may well be “semi-strong” path dependent. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 648-50 (1996).  
76 Many universities use gates, architecture, and campus security to keep out certain negative externalities, but there 
are limits to what these techniques can accomplish.  
77 As discussed below, however, universities are in the business of providing what Henry Hansmann calls an 




in the latter (theoretically) increases the quality of the university’s product and thus ensures 
(again theoretically) continued high demand for it among potential students.
78
 Thus the 
rationality of a particular investment is best analyzed through its impact on the university’s total 
bottom line—its success as an institution—rather than the narrow sense of whether the 
investment’s direct proceeds cover its costs.  
An example makes this clear. A university calculates that increasing the budget of its 
campus police force by $10,000 a year will reduce vandalism and damage to campus buildings 
by $5,000 a year. In the local sense, this is a bad investment. But globally, if the investment 
increases demand to work for and attend the institution by $200,000 a year, it is likely a sound 
one.
79
 This same dynamic can apply to real estate investment decisions. Building a new shopping 
center or renting to a particular tenant may be a local money-loser but a global money-winner if 
the costs of the investment exceed its direct returns but are less than its indirect returns of 
increased tuition and alumni giving from the happy feeling the new shopping center or store 
creates in potential students, faculty, and alumni.  
A final consideration should be noted here. As mentioned above, universities are repeat 
players with their communities. This means that the rational university will also consider how a 
                                                                                                                                                             
primarily use any gains in market power from increased demand for attendance to attract more-appealing students 
rather than to raise tuition. Id. at 190-91.  
78 Marcuse and Potter argue that appealing to the interests of students is what makes universities unique, since 
attracting quality faculty is no different from the need of every large institution, public or private, to attract quality 
employees and thus improve the quality of its products. Only universities must convince their clients, as well as their 
employees, to live near their institutional home for several years, making them unlike most other institutions. 
Marcuse & Potter, supra note 18, at 45. While the university’s need to attract quality faculty is clearly similar to the 
need of any institution to attract a quality workforce, it seems to me that the extraordinarily high human capital 
needed for becoming a university professor means that the supply of possible employees is much more limited, 
which makes it more essential for universities to appeal to the needs of faculty than is the case in most industries. 
Moreover, few companies have illiquid investments in particular communities on par with those of even a small 
university, meaning that most companies are much more mobile and thus the break-even point between investing to 
improve the surrounding community and relocating is much, much lower than it is for a university. Finally, 
Hansmann notes that universities have associative characteristics for faculty, not just students. HANSMANN, supra 
note 77, at 192. Ordinary employees do not ordinarily obtain such associational goods.  





particular investment now may influence the community and government’s willingness to let the 
university have its way in future interactions. Thus a money-losing investment today may be 
efficient if it creates so much community goodwill that it makes possible a future project that 
will generate significant returns for the university and would have otherwise been killed by 
community or government opposition. This dynamic is probably less important in the context of 
commercial real estate practices than in other areas where universities make investments to 
improve their surrounding communities, such as residential housing for non-affiliates and 
schools, but it is useful to keep it in mind.  
These dynamics thus produce the following positive model: universities maximize their 
self-interest measured broadly. Since universities’ investments in their primary activities are 
highly illiquid, even large losses in secondary investments such as real estate may be globally 
efficient. This is particularly true because universities’ physical concentration in a campus causes 
them to be greatly affected by the externalities generated by nearby properties. This model 
therefore predicts that universities will make many seemingly irrational investments that in fact 
serve their long-term best interests.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this theory of university behavior is dominant in the literature on 
university urban development. As mentioned above, one of the essential features of Columbia 
University’s innovative 1982 campus plan, arguably the prototype of the present-day model of 
university development seen at Penn and Yale, was to transition from a private-developer model 
of managing the university’s commercial property to something like the secondary-investor 
model, with the University making fine-grained land use decisions such as tenant selection with 
an eye toward how these decisions would affect the success of the University as a whole.
80
 Case 
                                                 




studies of universities’ urban development programs uniformly stress the importance of these 
considerations as the impetus for university actions.
81
  
But before simply accepting this dominant approach, we should think about what it 
actually means. In what way does it make sense to even say that a university has “interests” it 
tries to further? Is Yale itself really better off as an elite, secular, research institution than it was 
as a Congregationalist seminary? Than it would be if it had become a mid-ranked regional 
school? Than it would be if it became a community college catering to New Haven residents? 
This seems doubtful. Rather, when people talk about the “best interests” of a university, they are 
talking about the best interest of those people who comprise the university. In this respect, 
universities are no different from most other institutions. When people say that a corporation 
acted in its best interests by doing X, they do not mean that the corporation itself has interests, 
rather they mean that the corporation acted to further the interests of the people who have some 
claim on it, which usually means its owners.  
This means that to assign any real content to the phrase “best interests of the university” 
we have to decide whose interests universities serve. In other words, we need a theory about the 
nature of university “ownership.”82 Henry Hansmann has persuasively argued that colleges and 
universities, particularly elite ones, should be seen primarily as providing an associational 
good.
83
 By this, he means that the “customers” of the university, its students, choose where to 
attend college not solely based on the quality of school facilities or the education one receives 
there but based in part on the other students of the institution and its alumni. By attending a 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., RODIN, supra note 1, at 54-55; David Dixon & Peter J. Roche, Campus Partners and The Ohio State 
University: A Case Study in Enlightened Self-Interest, in THE UNIVERSITY AS URBAN DEVELOPER, supra note 1, at 
268, 281; Marcuse & Potter, supra note 18, at 45-47.  
82 Since universities are generally non-profits, they lack owners as this term is traditionally defined, since no one has 
a claim to residual profits. This does not mean that universities lack individuals who serve as the analogue of owners 
in a public corporation. 




college, one is purchasing an association that lasts for a lifetime, and so one has a strong interest 
in selecting the best association possible. In this respect, colleges and universities are much like 
social clubs.  
This creates a problem, however. Associational enterprises such as clubs or colleges will 
naturally stratify.
84
 This gives elite colleges a certain market power: individuals would, all else 
being equal, rather attend a more-elite institution. If the college were controlled by profit-
maximizing individuals, then, these owners would be able to charge quasi-monopoly prices and 
to expand the university.
85
 Some desirable students would therefore be unable to attend the 
institution while less-appealing students who could afford the high tuition would be admitted. 
Both of these developments would reduce the value of the association to the school’s alumni, 
who cannot change their association with a particular college once they have graduated. To avoid 
being exploited in this way, elite colleges are overwhelmingly organized as nonprofits controlled 
by current and former students so that no one is in a position to exploit the value of the college’s 
associational assets and reduce the value of the association to the alumni.
86
 But students are not 
the only members of the university community who derive associational benefits from 
membership. Faculty and to a lesser extent administrators no doubt prefer, all else being equal, to 
work at more-prestigious institutions in order to associate with interesting and successful peers.
87
 
Because these three groups, students (including former students), faculty, and administrators all 
have an associational interest in the university, these three groups typically control university 
decisions. I will call these groups the university’s “affiliates.” Other groups that are part of the 
                                                 
84 Id. at 186-87.  
85 Id. at 189-90.  
86 Id. at 190-91. Hansmann further notes that universities are overwhelmingly organized as nonprofits because they 
are funded in large part by donations, and donative organizations are more successful as nonprofits because the lack 
of owners with a right to residual earnings means that their gifts are less likely to be subverted. Id. at 230-33.  




university or deal with it on a regular basis,
88
 such as its staff, generally have no greater say in 
university governance than do the employees of a corporation, because the staff of a university, 
like the employees of a corporation, lack the strong associational ties with the university and thus 
there is no reason for these individuals to have significant power within it. 
When clarified in this way, the secondary investor model becomes more robust. When we 
say the university makes secondary investments in order to advance the university’s best 
interests, we mean nothing more than that the university works to advance the best interests of its 
affiliates.  The “best interests” of the university simply are the aggregated best interests of its 
affiliates. Investments in secondary areas, such as commercial real estate, may advance the best 
interests of the university’s affiliates by making the university a more-appealing place, thus 
allowing it to increase the value of the associational good it offers. This further means that the 
university can attract more talented students, faculty, and administrators for the same cost, 
thereby enhancing its ability to provide high-value educational services. Thus the fullest 
statement of the secondary investor model is that the university will take actions that best serve 
the interests of its affiliates measured in aggregate.  
2.3 The University as Political Institution 
This statement of the university’s objective—advancing the best interests of its 
affiliates—leads to the third model of university behavior: the university as a political institution. 
By and large, the university’s affiliates will be relatively homogenous. They will have similar 
                                                 
88 Hansmann uses the term “patrons” to describe all those who transact with an enterprise, whether as purchasers of 
its products or sellers of supplies, labor, or other factors of production. Id. at 12. On Hansmann’s view, the general 
principle of ownership is that enterprises assign ownership to those groups of patrons who it would be very costly to 
contract with, thereby reducing the total costs of the enterprise by making these patrons “owners.” Id. at 20-22. In 
ordinary public corporations, it would be very expensive to obtain all of the firm’s capital through contract, so these 
firms are typically owned by their investors. Id. at 53. In the university context, it would be very expensive to 
contract with students, alumni, faculty, and administrators given the associational goods supplied by the university, 
so this form of enterprise is controlled by these classes of patrons. My use of the term “affiliates” is therefore not 
equivalent to Hansmann’s “patrons” but rather denotes a certain class of patrons who occupy a position similar to 




backgrounds and tastes and are pursuing similar careers. Moreover, at most urban universities, 
the university’s affiliates tend to cluster within certain university neighborhoods, and thus are 
similarly affected by university investments in physical space.
89
 Individuals with this much in 
common will have many interests in common.  
But it would be absurd to think that the interests of university affiliates will never 
conflict. Sometimes, what is best for current students will be harmful to the alumni or faculty, or 
less good for them than alternatives that are less good for students. And when this is the case, 
aggregating the best interests of the university’s affiliates no longer becomes a simple task. This 
is particularly so because different subsets of a university’s affiliates will likely have very 
different governance costs.
90
 The faculty, for example, may be able to organize more cheaply 
and tailor university policy to their needs than the alumni, who are often physically distant from 
the university and its day to day struggles. The same public-choice problems that afflict 
governmental institutions should also be found within universities.
91
 I will have more to say 
about these issues later in the paper, but for now it is enough to note that while the university 
may in theory attempt to maximize the aggregate best interests of its affiliates, differences in 
political power among the university’s affiliates may result in it pursuing policies that advance 
the interests of some within the university to the detriment of the best interests of the affiliates as 
a whole. The university as political institution model predicts that universities will pursue those 




                                                 
89 In New Haven, Yale affiliates are heavily clustered in East Rock, the Nine Squares, the eastern part of Dwight, 
and West Rock.  
90 See HANSMANN, supra note 77, at 39-44 (discussing the costs of governance).  
91 See id. at 287-89 (recommending that firms be viewed in part as political institutions).  
92 It is tempting to view this model as merely stating that universities behaving under the second model will simply 
fail to meet their goal of maximizing aggregate affiliate best interests because of internal political dynamics. This is 




2.4 Agency Slack 
There are two other theories of university behavior that merit brief mention. The first of 
these, agency slack, is a qualification of the above models rather than a complete model on its 
own. The university, of course, like any other institution, cannot act on its own but must act 
through agents, who necessarily must have some discretion in carrying out their duties. In this 
context, the agents are those who manage the university’s commercial real estate investments. As 
in the corporate context, the interests of agents may diverge from the interests of the university’s 
affiliates.
93
 Thus the agents managing the university’s real estate may make decisions that are 
beneficial to them personally but not in the best interests either of the university’s affiliates in 
aggregate, if we assume the second model, or of its most powerful affiliate groups, if we assume 
the third. A small-scale example of this would be an employee in a university’s commercial real 
estate office deciding to lease property to a particular tenant because he is personal friends with 
that tenant despite believing that tenant would be less beneficial to the quality of the surrounding 
area than other candidates. We can also imagine more-consequential instances of this. For 
example, the senior administrators of a university’s commercial real estate division may 
recognize that the affiliates whose best interests they are supposed to advance will become upset 
if the university’s property is rented to a tenant they dislike but will never attribute the opening 
of attractive tenants to the university’s actions. As a result, these administrators may be risk 
averse, since they are much more likely to be punished if a risky tenant falls short of expectations 
than if it exceeds expectations or is never allowed to rent property in the first place.  
                                                                                                                                                             
maximize affiliates best interests in aggregate. Rather, they have a completely different objective function: 
maximizing the best interests of the more-powerful affiliate groups. They do not fail to achieve the goal assumed by 
the second model; they are not even attempting to achieve it.  
93 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 





Before moving ahead, I should further clarify how I will use the term agency slack. This 
clarification is needed because certain outcomes could be described either using the political 
institution model or as examples of agency slack. For example, if a university’s faculty uses 
governance institutions such as the faculty senate to tilt the university’s policies toward their 
interests at the expense of the aggregate best interests of the university’s affiliates as a whole, is 
this an agency problem or a governance problem? The answer to this depends on our institutional 
theory of the university. If we think that the university’s only goal should be to advance the best 
interests of its current, past, and future students, with all other ends subordinated to this, then we 
would describe this as an agency problem, because one group of the university’s agents, its 
faculty, has used the students’ inability to monitor the university’s policies to distort these 
policies to the faculty’s ends. If, however, we think that universities serve a broader 
constituency, including faculty, then we would describe the faculty’s action using the political 
institution model.  
In many cases, this distinction will not matter, at least as far as this paper is concerned. 
Whether we regard the previous example as a problem of politics or agency, the upshot is the 
same: in both cases, the university has departed from optimal policy, defined as serving the best 
interests of its affiliates in aggregate. Distinguishing between political failure and agency 
problems is important in two contexts, however. First, it would be important if our goal were to 
correct suboptimal policies. In such cases, we would need to know how these suboptimal policies 
came about, so correctly characterizing the source of these inefficiencies would be important. 
Second, and more important, these issues make a difference when it comes to deciding whether 
the university’s policy is optimal in the first place. Recall that I have described the university’s 




consisting of all those who derive associational value from the university: its students, faculty, 
and administrators. Other theoretical accounts of the university may deny that the best interests 
of some of these groups should be considered at all, except as a means to serving the best 
interests of some other more fundamental group.
94
 Or they may admit that the interests of all 
three groups should be valued as ends alone but put different weight on the interests of each 
group.
95
 These different definitions of whose interests the university should serve mean that there 
are some outcomes I would define as optimal—that is, maximizing the aggregate best interests of 
the university’s affiliates—that others would describe as the result of agency problems. This is 
because I include the best interests of faculty and administrators in my calculation of aggregate 
utility, while others may not.  
What this means is that different theoretical accounts of the university change whether an 
outcome is seen as optimal, the result of defective internal governance, or a simple agency 
problem. Because I have defined the university’s best interest as being whatever is in the best 
interests of its affiliates and have defined affiliates to include students, faculty, and alumni, the 
range of outcomes I would see as plausibly optimal is relatively large. Further, because my 
definition posits that the university can and should balance the best interests of these three very 
different groups, the scope for political decisionmaking within my theory of the university is 
quite broad. One who rejected my assumption that it is legitimate for the university to advance 
the best interests of faculty and administrators as an ends in themselves would see the range of 
optimal policies as quite small. And because the only patron group whose interests the university 
could legitimately serve, its students and alumni, are much more homogeneous than three 
                                                 
94 Such an account would probably focus on the best interests of students and alumni, seeing anything that serves the 
best interests of faculty and administrators as only justifiable if it ultimately advances the interests of students and 
alumni.  
95 For example, one could accept that students, faculty, and administrators’ best interests should all count, but think 




disparate affiliate groups, they would see fewer circumstances where suboptimal outcomes are 
due to political forces, instead attributing most suboptimal policies to agency slack.  
 I have already said more on this than is warranted, since given the limited goals of my 
paper, this theoretical issue has few substantive ramifications and only terminological ones. But 
to clarify my terms, throughout this paper, I will use the political institution model to describe 
cases where disparate power among the university’s affiliates leads it to adopt formal policies or 
goals that further the best interests of the more-powerful affiliates more than alternative policies 
that would result in greater aggregate benefits but fewer benefits to the more-powerful affiliate 
groups. When I refer to agency problems, I mean cases in which the inability of the university’s 
affiliates to perfectly monitor university administrators’ exercise of discretion in implementing 
these policies results in suboptimal outcomes—those where the aggregate gains are lower than 
they would be if different decisions had been made. This distinction, then, is primarily one of 
whether the suboptimal outcome is the result of a deliberate policy arrived at through deficient 
political structures or the result of difficult-to-monitor administrative discretion.
96
  
2.5 Moral Obligation 
 A final theory of university behavior deserving mention is the “moral obligation” model. 
It is not uncommon to find within the literature on university urban development the claim that 
universities are morally obligated, either because of their expertise, superior resources, or 
history, to act in a way that benefits their surrounding communities.
97
 While this sounds very 
nice, it adds nothing to the above theories. I see no reason to claim that universities as entities 
                                                 
96 Agency costs should not be seen as an independent model because they are simply pathologies that can afflict any 
of the first three models. Even if agency costs are very high, the university’s objective remains to maximize the 
economic returns on its investments, the best interests of its affiliates as a whole, or the interests of its most-
powerful affiliates. Agency costs simply limit reaching these ends rather than changing the end sought, and so they 
do not provide a fourth model because they do not specify a new way of conceiving of the university’s aim.  




can have moral obligations. But clearly their affiliates can. When so clarified in this way, 
however, the moral obligation model merely reduces to the university as secondary investor 
model—the university works to maximize the best interests of its affiliates as a whole, including 
their moral interests—or to the political institution model—the university works to maximize the 
best interests of the most politically powerful affiliates, including their moral interests. Moral 
obligations certainly can be part of the interests of affiliates that universities aim to further. But 
discussing this in terms of the university’s moral obligation produces no meaningful additional 
insights, so I will not talk in this way.   
3. YALE UNIVERSITY’S COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE PROGRAM 
In this Part, I will discuss the details of Yale University’s program to improve the New 
Haven area by investing in commercial real estate. I begin by giving an overview of the history 
of Yale’s efforts. I then discuss the institutional structure of Yale’s program. Next, I turn to the 
details of Yale’s current activities, looking at those aspects of the program I consider noteworthy. 
Finally, I conclude with a brief look at other major initiatives by the University to rejuvenate 
New Haven in order to put Yale’s commercial real estate investments in context. 
3.1 The History of Yale’s Program 
Narrating the history of Yale’s program is slightly difficult because it is unclear when 
Yale began thinking of its real estate investments as a means to improve New Haven. As with 
Columbia and Penn, much of the property currently rented to commercial tenants by the 
University was acquired long before any “program.”98 Acquisitions along Broadway, 
Audubon/Whitney, and Wall Street were already well underway by the 1950s, with most pieces 
                                                 
98 All information about property ownership, dates of acquisition, and current assessed value are based on the New 
Haven Tax Assessor’s online database. ASSESSORS ONLINE DATABASE FOR NEW HAVEN, CT, 




of the University’s current portfolio purchased by the late 1970s.99 Some of this property was 
acquired in connection with specific University plans. For example, as mentioned above, the 
University once hoped to build two new residential colleges at the corner of Grove and 
Whitney.
100
 This presumably explains why it purchased some property in the area around that 
time. The majority of the property acquired by the University before the 1990s, however, does 
not appear to have been purchased as part of any definite plan. I would speculate that most of it 
was purchased according to a philosophy akin to Columbia’s “deck of playing cards” approach, 
in which any potential useful available properties were acquired, with a plan for them to be 
developed later.
101
 Throughout this period, all of Yale’s properties were managed by its 
investment office simply as a part of its endowment.
102
 
The emergence of a distinct program began around the time of Richard Levin’s 
appointment as president of the University in 1993. Soon after his arrival, he established the 
Office of New Haven and State Affairs (ONHSA) to manage all community outreach activities 
on behalf of the University.
103
 These outreach activities included programs designed to improve 
the New Haven area, such as the Yale Homebuyer Program, which provides mortgage assistance 
to Yale employees who purchase homes in certain areas of the city.
104
 In 1996, the University 
recognized that commercial real estate could assist in its aspirations of improving New Haven, so 
it transferred much of its real estate portfolio from the investments office to the control of 
                                                 
99 I describe the current portfolio in a general way infra Subsection 3.3.1. For a map of Yale’s properties in the 
downtown New Haven area, see Figure 1. For a complete list of current properties owned by Yale and managed as 
part of its commercial real estate program, see the Appendix. Because the information reported in the Appendix is 
derived from the New Haven Assessor’s Office, it uses the addresses in that database. For reasons I do not 
understand, the addresses in the database do not always match the present street addresses of these properties.  
100 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
101 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
102 Gretchen Hoff, Shopping, Safety, and Students: Yale University’s Brand of Urban Renewal 44-45 (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript).  
103 DeWitt, supra note 53; David McKay Wilson, Yale and New Haven Find Common Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/16yalect.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 






 Very shortly after this, the University created University Properties (UP), a branch 
of ONHSA tasked with managing the University’s commercial and residential real estate.106 
Finally in 1998, Bruce Alexander, a former executive of the Rouse Company who had worked 
on Fenueil Hall in Boston, the South Street Seaport in New York City, and the Harborplace Mall 
in Baltimore, was hired to run ONHSA, which necessarily included the management of Yale’s 
property through ONHSA’s subsidiary, University Properties.107 While the hiring of Alexander 
to head this office indicates that Yale already considered the management of its commercial real 
estate to be a major priority, his background no doubt increased the importance of this program 
among Yale’s efforts to improve New Haven. 
President Levin’s tenure has seen three significant changes to Yale’s commercial 
property. First, Yale has invested a significant sum, by one measure $6.2 million, in improving 
the Broadway area.
108
 This began soon after President Levin’s arrival, when the University 
contributed $2 million and the federal government $4 million to improve the street layout, 
upgrade sidewalks, and enhance storefronts.
109
 Soon after, the University began a more-
ambitious program to remake Broadway. The project began in 1997, when the University 
replaced the Yale Co-Op, its longtime bookstore, with a Barnes & Noble.
110
 This change was 
                                                 
105 Hoff attributes this innovation to Levin and University Secretary Linda Lorimer, who personally managed these 
properties for some period. Hoff, supra note 102, at 57. 
106 DeWitt, supra note 53.  
107 Wilson, supra note 103.  
108 Eli Bildner, Officials Not Concerned by Vacancies, University Properties Expects To Fill Several Storefronts in 
Coming Months, YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2006/nov/07/officials-
not-concerned-by-vacancies/. The University will apparently add to this figure by spending nearly $5 million to 
renovate one of its Broadway properties in order to attract Apple as a tenant. Thomas MacMillan, Broadway Getting 
$4.8M Apple Makeover, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/yale_readies_for_apple_with_4.8_m/ 
109 Eleanor Charles, In the Region/Connecticut; Yale Works to Break Down the Town-Gown Barrier, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/realestate/in-the-region-connecticut-yale-works-to-break-
down-the-town-gown-barrier.html?scp=1&sq=yale+town+gown+barrier&st=nyt; Hoff, supra note 102, at 51. 
110 Mark Alden Branch, Barnes and Noble and Mom and Pop, YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Feb. 1999, at 34, 39; Erin 
Donar, Over 5 Years, a New Yale Face for Broadway, YALE DAILY NEWS (May 26, 2002), 




motivated by two considerations: the desire to bring in a national tenant that could serve as an 
“anchor” for the renovated Broadway area and the Co-Op’s refusal to participate in the 
University’s efforts to extend the operating hours of Broadway businesses until nine pm.111 Next, 
the University moved several tenants, demolished their former buildings, and built a completely 
new retail space with room for four tenants in the center of Broadway.
112
 The University then 
wooed a number of prominent national chains to serve as additional anchor tenants for the area, 
including J.Crew, Urban Outfitters, Origins, and Au Bon Pain, all of which had opened by 2001. 
As part of this process of making Broadway friendlier to shopping, many service businesses such 
as barber shops were moved to less-prominent locations, particularly second floors,
113
 while the 
leases of some businesses Yale disliked were not renewed.
114
 The physical changes in Broadway 
as well as new requirements imposed on University tenants were particularly disruptive to many 
established tenants, leading many of them to close after decades of operation in the Broadway 
area.
115
 By 2002-03, this process was more or less complete; while there have obviously been 
changes in the tenant mix since this period, ambitious reworking of Broadway had ended. 
                                                                                                                                                             
replaced its bookstore with a Barnes & Noble at nearly the same time. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. It 
is unclear whether this was merely a coincidence, the result of some corporate strategy by Barnes & Noble to open 
new college bookstores, or whether one university was influenced by the other. Yale has specifically disclaimed 
being influenced by Penn or any other university’s urban development program, see infra Subsection 3.3.11. 
111 Branch, supra note 110, at 39; Hoff, supra note 102, at 51. On the University’s nine pm policy, see infra 
Subsection 3.3.5. 
112 Karen Abrecht, Yesterday’s Broadway Lives on in Family Businesses, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 1998, at 1; 
Hoff, supra note 102, at 51-52. This structure is currently the home to J.Crew, Urban Outfitters, Laila Rowe, and 
Thom Browne.  
113 Branch, supra note 110, at 39.  
114 One prominent example of this was Krauszer’s. See Henry Wong, Gourmet? My Snapple Still Tastes the Same, 
YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2001), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/mar/26/gourmet-my-snapple-still-
tastes-the-same/. I discuss these episodes in greater detail infra Subsections 3.3.3 and 3.3.6. 
115 Two prominent examples were Quality Wine, see DeWitt, supra note 53, and Barrie Ltd., see Tom Sullivan, 
Barrie Ltd. Booters Plans To Close Shop, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2003), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2003/sep/11/barrie-ltd-booters-plans-to-close-shop/. See also Hoff, supra note 




The second major event in the history of Yale’s program was the acquisition of fifteen 
properties on Chapel and College Streets in the late 1990s.
116
 This episode began in the 1980s, 
when New Haven real estate developer Joel Schiavone gradually assembled a significant block 
of properties on Chapel Street between High and Temple, on College Street between Chapel and 
Crown, and on Crown Street between College and High.
117
 By all accounts, the management of 
these properties as a unit substantially enhanced their value.
118
 However, Schiavone lost control 
of these properties in 1992, when his partner, First Constitution Bank, failed and was taken over 
the FDIC.
119
 Schiavone’s wife continued to manage these properties for several years while the 
couple attempted to regain control of them, but they never managed to do so. In the late 1990s, 
New Haven Mayor John DeStefano, apparently worried that the properties would be auctioned 
off separately and thereby lose the benefits of common ownership, convinced Yale to purchase 
these properties as a block.
120
 Yale completed this deal in early 1999, paying $5 million to 
purchase all but one of the properties in foreclosure.
121
  
Finally, Yale’s most-recent activity has been on Audubon Street and Whitney Avenue. 
The University has long owned a stretch of properties (with a few holes) on the west side of 
                                                 
116 News sources are inconsistent regarding both the number of properties Yale purchased and the price it paid for 
these properties. Compare Brenda Marks, Business Booster: Yale University Invests in Small Businesses Downtown, 
NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Aug. 24, 2003), 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2003/08/24/import/10056681.txt?viewmode=fullstory (16 buildings for $9.5 
million), with Hoff, supra note 102, at 55 (14 for $5 million). This confusion is due to two factors. First, the Tax 
Assessor’s database splits these properties up in a way that does not necessarily conform to how the average 
observer would describe them. See supra note 99. This makes it possible to describe the sale of this block of 
buildings in several ways, depending on how one defines each building. Second, some of the properties purchased in 
this sale were vacant space or parking lots. By my count, the University purchased twelve buildings and three vacant 
properties in this sale. These two points do not, however, account for the different figures given for price. I have 
used the figure quoted in Hoff because this figure is found in numerous sources, while Marks’s figure is unique.  
117 Schiavone also owned two properties on Chapel west of York street, both of which the University later acquired. 
118 See, e.g., Chris Capot, Schiavone Striving To Regain Real Estate, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Oct. 9, 1995, at A1.  
119 Id; see also Arielle Levin Becker, Schiavone, From the Banjo to the Stump, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2001), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/oct/15/schiavone-from-the-banjo-to-the-stump/. 
120 James M. Klatell, Yale Leads New Haven’s Renaissance, CBSNEWS.COM (June 10, 2006), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/10/national/main1699378_page2.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody. 
121 Hoff, supra note 102, at 55. For reasons unknown to me, Yale chose not to purchase the former Palace Theater 




Whitney between Grove and Trumbull, beginning approximately half way up the street. In 1997, 
it expanded these holdings by purchasing a large office building at the corner of Whitney and 
Grove, conveniently called the Whitney Grove building.
122
 It expanded again in 2002, acquiring 
a rather substantial block of property on the east side of Whitney and north side of Audubon.
123
 
In this purchase, which as far as I can tell went completely unnoted at the time by both the 
student and professional press, the University purchased the 55 Whitney Avenue building and all 
the ground-floor retail space on the north side of Audubon between Whitney and Orange, 
apparently for the sum of $10.2 million.  
After this purchase, Yale has been relatively quiet. The University has purchased a 
number of properties within the downtown area, many of which are retail properties with 
existing tenants.
124
 But these properties should probably not be considered part of Yale’s 
commercial real estate program.
125
 The University has also presumably purchased properties 
through front corporations, a tactic it has used in the past, but such acquisitions are both 
impossible to discover and not particularly relevant to the topic of this paper, which is interested 
in Yale’s public program of commercial real estate. Yale has added to its portfolio of properties 
since 2002 by building new campus facilities with ground floor retail space, such as the Howe 
                                                 
122 Branch, supra note 110, at 37. 
123 David Shieh, Audubon Finally Fills Up, YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 10, 2005), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2005/nov/10/audubon-finally-fills-up/. 
124 For example, in the last five years, Yale has purchased several properties on York Street (e.g., 142 and 146), 
while in 2005 it acquired several properties on the western portion of Crown Street (e.g., 331 Crown and some 
neighboring properties). 
125 There are three reasons for this. First, the University does not itself seem to regard these properties as part of its 
commercial real estate program. For example, vacancies in these spaces are not listed on the University Properties 
website and the University does not appear to apply the same policies, such as tenant selection, to these properties as 
to those on, say, Chapel Street. Second, these properties are generally ill suited to the upscale retail Yale wishes to 
attract, as they are generally run-down and shabby. Finally, these properties are concentrated on blocks where the 
University already has existing holdings devoted to educational or administrative functions. I suspect that the 
University intends to demolish or seriously renovate these structures and then devote this space either to school uses 
or to retail, at which point the properties would be brought within the fold of the University’s program. Currently, 
these properties are likely being held as is until existing leases expire or the University can obtain the needed 




Street Garage. But these additions are of minor importance because the University has yet to find 
tenants for them. Finally, since the arrival of Bruce Alexander in the late 1990s, Yale’s strategy 
for managing its properties has been more or less consistent, though obviously with some 
evolution in response to market forces. With this background in mind, I will now discuss the 
institutional structure of Yale’s program. 
3.2 Current Institutional Structure 
Yale’s program is managed by three main entities. The first is the Office of New Haven 
and State Affairs. This small office is run by Bruce Alexander, Vice President for New Haven 
and State Affairs and Campus Development.
126
 None of the administrators in this office except 
for Alexander appear to have any duties related to the management of Yale’s real estate.127 
Instead, ONHSA focuses primarily on interacting with state and local government and 
community organizations and managing Yale programs in other areas, such as its efforts to 
improve New Haven’s public schools.  
University Properties, housed within ONHSA and run under the direction of Alexander, 
is the entity primarily responsible for Yale’s commercial real estate program. This office is, 
frankly, a bit of a black box. In 2004, it was managed by David Newton with a staff of 
approximately ten, many of whom were recent graduates from Yale’s School of Management.128 
Newton has since retired,
129
 and the office is currently run by Abigail Rider, who previously 
                                                 
126 The addition of this last element to Bruce Alexander’s title is recent: its first appearance in a newspaper article is 
in 2008. See Sam Pilku, Mayor Unveils $1.6M Plan for Economic Development, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2008), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2008/feb/01/mayor-unveils-16m-plan-for-economic-development/. 
127 Michael Morand, former Associate Vice President for New Haven and State Affairs in ONHSA frequently 
commented on Yale’s commercial real estate to the press. However, he recently joined the University’s Office of 
Public Affairs and Communications and thus is no longer affiliated with ONHSA. Danny Serna, Morand Joins 
Office of Public Affairs and Communications, YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/nov/15/morand-joins-office-of-public-affairs-and/. 
128 Hoff, supra note 102, at 58. 
129 Reading between the lines, it is likely that Newton’s departure was related to the University’s dispute with the 




worked for Brown University, where she was the director of its real estate office.
130
 According to 
Yale’s employee directory, the office currently has a staff of eight.131 This office handles nearly 
all aspects of Yale’s commercial real estate program, including selecting tenants, negotiating 
leases, and coordinating advertising campaigns. The evidence strongly suggests, however, that 




The day-to-day management of Yale’s commercial properties, by which I mean 
maintenance requests and the like, is managed by an outside entity, Elm Campus Partners. While 
Elm Campus’s involvement in commercial real estate is limited, it is much more active in the 
management of Yale’s residential properties, as it is responsible for advertising and leasing all of 
these units.
133
 Elm Campus Partners was started by two Yale School of Management graduates, 
Andy Lewandowski and Troy Resch, the latter a former associate director at University 
Properties.
134
 It commenced operations on January 1, 2006, and was immediately given the 
contract to manage the University’s properties.135 It manages no properties other than the 
University’s. As this timeline suggests, Elm Campus Partners was spun off from within 
                                                                                                                                                             
Properties Head Begins Amid Conflict, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 19, 2007), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2007/oct/19/univ-properties-head-begins-amid-conflict/. I discuss this curious 
episode in greater detail infra Subsection 3.3.8.  
130 Id. 
131 Directory of Organizations, YALE UNIVERSITY, http://www.yale.edu/directory/FinalUpdates/DirectoryOrgs.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011).  
132 Its former director, David Newton, was once quoted in Business New Haven as saying that he had “a lot of 
responsibility but very limited authority.” Yu, supra note 129. Many of Yale’s tenants reportedly agreed with his 
assessment. After Newton’s departure following the Bespoke episode, UP has become even more inscrutable. When 
Gretchen Hoff wrote a paper on Yale’s commercial real estate program in 2004, she was able to interview three UP 
employees, including Newton. All of my attempts to contact UP managers, including Rider, in researching this 
paper were passed on to Bruce Alexander, who responded personally to all my inquiries. While he was certainly 
very helpful in writing this paper, it is an unusual (to say the least) to find an institution in which only the highest 
person on its organizational chart will speak with a law student writing a paper. For an additional anecdote regarding 
my interactions with University Properties that suggests its lack of discretion, see infra note 188. 
133 On Yale’s residential properties, see infra Section 3.4. 
134 See Hoff, supra note 102, at 50. Attempts to interview them were unsuccessful.  





University Properties to replace its existing management firms.
136
 It has maintained very close 
ties with University Properties.
137
 
Throughout the history of its real estate program, Yale has always contracted out day-to-
day management of its properties to a private firm.
138
 Presumably, Yale began this practice when 
its property was managed by its investment office, which was likely ill-equipped to handle the 
maintenance needs of tenants. When these properties were moved to the newly created ONHSA 
and UP, they too probably lacked the capacity to handle these operations initially. It is somewhat 
puzzling, however, that Yale has continued to contract these services out, particularly since the 
University clearly has significant internal capacity for building maintenance and the like. 
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that UP would have been unable to take on these responsibilities 
in house in 2005, since at least one founder of Elm Campus Partners was a UP employee at the 
time. If UP believed he had the ability to manage daily operations in a private firm, it is hard to 
see why he would not have the ability to do so in-house. 
I believe that the University’s continual practice of contracting the daily management of 
its properties to an outside firm can be explained by three factors. First, there are probably 
reputational benefits from this arrangement. Tenants who are unhappy with the response to their 
maintenance requests do not become angry with Yale if these services are provided by a private 
                                                 
136 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, Vice President for New Haven and State Affairs and Campus 
Development, Yale University (Feb. 18, 2011). Prior to this, Yale’s residential properties were managed by Owens, 
Renz and Lee Company, Shieh, supra note 135, and its commercial properties by ProManagement Services, Hoff, 
supra note 102, at 58. 
137 Elm Campus Partners leases its office space from the University.  
138 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136. Interestingly, one of Yale’s first managers was 
Schiavone Management Co., owned by Craig and Joel Schiavone. For unknown reasons, this relationship 
deteriorated, the Schiavones were fired, and several lawsuits were filed. See, e.g., Randall Beach, Schiavone Says 
Yale Plays Rough, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 16, 2001), 
http://www.newhavenregister.com/articles/2001/02/16/import/1421542.txt; Tom Sullivan, Yale Fires Schiavone 







 Thus Yale avoids having animosity directed at it from frustrated tenants. Second, Yale 
employees are heavily unionized and receive generous salaries and benefits. Hiring an outside 
firm with very close ties to UP to provide these services allows Yale to achieve many of the 
benefits of internal management, while also paying sub-union wages and benefits.
140
 Finally, and 
perhaps most important, contracting these services out to a private firm allows UP to maintain 
greater discipline, since if the management company is not performing adequately it is much 
simpler to not renew their contract than to fire an entire in-house division. This threat may 
induce better performance than if these services were provided from within UP.  
3.3 Notable Practices 
In this Section, I will discuss several noteworthy practices of Yale’s program to improve 
New Haven through investments in commercial real estate. For the most part this Section is 
merely descriptive. Explaining why the University had adopted these policies will be the primary 
task of Part 4. I will, however, mention Yale’s own explanation for some of these policies.141 
And I will also attempt to account for a few minor practices that are not closely integrated with 
Yale’s overall plans but instead are the result of idiosyncratic forces.  
3.3.1 A Sketch of Yale’s Holdings 
While very little of New Haven’s total commercial real estate is owned by Yale, it is the 
city’s largest commercial landlord and within downtown New Haven its holdings are significant. 
These holdings are heavily concentrated in three areas, forming particular blocks or stretches of 
blocks in which Yale is the majority and sometimes the dominant landowner. A complete list of 
                                                 
139 Remember that Elm Campus Partners is not only responsible for managing the daily needs of the University’s 
commercial tenants, but also the tenants of its roughly 500 residential units.  
140 This assumes that unionized Yale employees are entitled to above market compensation, which seems likely. The 
minimum hourly wage for a Yale “maintenance technician” is $16.73 an hour, with a maximum of $23.67. Appendix 
1-A—Salary Structure, YALE UNIVERSITY, http://www.yale.edu/hronline/labrelat/Salarystructure.htm (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2011). Maintenance technicians are rated on the Labor Grade B scale. C&T Salary Structure Grid, YALE 
UNIVERSITY, http://www.yale.edu/hronline/compclas/ctgrid.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).  




all Yale properties rented out to commercial tenants within downtown New Haven is provided in 
the Appendix. Figure 1 provides a map of Yale’s current commercial property. The areas in blue 
are campus facilities, including administrative buildings. The yellow areas denote the 
University’s commercial real estate.142 
 
Figure 1: Yale’s Downtown Property 
Yale’s foremost concentration of commercial real estate is in the Broadway district.143 I 
define this district as consisting of Elm Street between Park and York, York Street both north 
and south of Elm, and both the northeast and southwest side of Broadway. Beginning with the 
latter, Yale owns the entirety of the northeast side of the street except for a small building that 
currently houses A-One Pizza on Broadway and a larger building with several tenants further up 
the street that houses Campus Customs, Blue Jay Cleaners, American Apparel, and the Educated 
                                                 
142 I have colored yellow any building with retail space. Thus buildings such as the Yale British Art Gallery, which 
has retail space on the ground floor but space used by the University on the upper floors, is colored yellow. I have 
also colored yellow commercial properties that currently lack tenants.  
143 Clearly, the University owns more property and has more tenants along Chapel Street. But Yale owns more than 






 On York, Yale owns all the buildings between J. Press to the south, which is 
independently owned, and Yorkside Pizza, which is also independent. Yale does not own Toad’s 
Place or the space occupied by Labyrinth Books. Finally, on Elm, Yale owns all properties on 
the south side of the street between Park and York except for Tyco. Yale owns none of the 
buildings on the north side of Elm. Yale began acquiring property in the Broadway area before 
the 1950s and had purchased essentially all of its current holdings by the mid 1970s.
145
 
Yale’s second-most significant block of property is along Chapel and College streets and 
consists primarily of the former Schiavone properties that it purchased in 1999.
146
 The University 
owns two properties on Chapel west of York, one on the north side mid block and one on the 
southwest corner of Chapel and York. The University then owns a long strip on the south side of 
Chapel running from York to College. There is no commercial real estate on the north side of the 
street. Within this strip, the University does not own two prominent buildings: the building that 
houses the Starbucks on the corner of Chapel and High, and a larger building adjacent to this that 
houses Enson’s, News Haven, Savitt Jewelers, Allegra Printing, Merwin’s Art Shop, and Ten 
Thousand Villages. The rest of this strip is entirely the University’s, including the recessed and 
lower-level properties at 1044 Chapel and the lower-level properties at 1020 Chapel.
147
 Yale also 
owns two buildings west of College, 986 and 976 Chapel Street, both of which are currently 
vacant. Yale owns the building at 260 College Street and the three buildings on College Street 
                                                 
144 As mentioned previously, all information about property ownership, dates of acquisition, etc., comes from the 
New Haven Tax Assessor’s online database. See supra note 98. Some of these tenants are housed in the renovated 
York Square Cinema building, which closed in 2005. See Randall Beach, Leaking Roof, Thousands in Back Rent 
Play Role in Theater’s End, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, July 4, 2005, at A1.  
145 Hoff, supra note 102, at 49.  
146 See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text. The only Yale tenants in this area that are not in space acquired 
from the Schiavone sale is the Willoughby’s Coffee location on the ground floor of the School of Architecture 
building on York and Chapel and several tenants on the ground floor of the Yale British Art Gallery on Chapel.  
147 I have departed here from the practice in the Appendix by listing the properties according to their current street 
addresses. These properties are listed in the New Haven Tax Assessor’s database as 1042 and 1022 Chapel, 




closest to Crown. The former previously housed Celtica, but is now vacant because that tenant 
has moved into another Yale property, the space formerly occupied by the Copper Kitchen on 
Chapel. The latter houses three restaurants: Pacifico, Samurai, and Oaxaca Kitchen. Finally, Yale 
owns a number of parking lots and vacant spaces in the interior of this block.   
Yale owns several properties along Whitney between Grove and Trumbull and on 
Audubon. On Whitney, Yale owns the entire west side of the street except for two small 
buildings in the center that house a Dunkin’ Donuts and a Subway and a stretch of ground-floor 
retail space near Whitney Avenue that houses Knit, FedEx/Kinkos, and a realtor’s office.148 Yale 
owns none of the east side of the street except for a rather large building at 55 Whitney, which 
houses several tenants. Yale owns none of the buildings on the south side of Audubon, but all the 
ground-floor retail space on the north side between Whitney and Orange.
149
 Most of the 
properties on Audubon are vacant or house service businesses such as Salon Ivanova.  
Yale also owns scattered properties. The most important of these for my purposes is a 
small strip along Wall Street between College and Temple that houses Naples Wall Street Pizza, 
Blue State Coffee, and Phil’s Hair Styles. Finally, Yale owns a number of properties that are 
unique and best considered on their own rather than analyzed as part of Yale’s general program 
of improving New Haven through commercial real estate. Thus the University owns vacant retail 
space at the bottom of two parking garages, one on Howe Street, a recently constructed building 
that has never had any tenants, and one on York between Crown and Chapel. Yale also has a 
handful of properties surrounding the medical school, again mostly on the ground floor of 
buildings used for other purposes. Finally, the University owns a considerable amount of 
                                                 
148 This stretch of retail space is located below a large condominium complex.  
149 These buildings are condominiums with ground-floor retail space. The above-ground condominiums are owned 




commercial property at its Science Park site. But these properties should be seen as part of 
Yale’s ambitions for Science Park rather than for improving downtown.  
3.3.2 Yale’s Three Neighborhoods 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, Yale’s properties in downtown New Haven 
break down into three areas: Broadway, Chapel Street (which includes the College Street 
properties), and Audubon/Whitney. Yale has a definite “vision” for each of these areas. 
Broadway is intended to be the most student-focused of the three, with retail and food 
establishments that appeal to students and faculty.
150
 However, the University is careful to ensure 
that the area does not become too dependent on students, in part because Yale students are absent 
or much diminished in number for five months of the year, meaning that businesses generally 
must draw in some non-student customers to be successful.
151
 The University thus has tried to 
manage the area so as to appeal to Yale students, the students of other New Haven colleges and 
universities,
152
 and to suburban shoppers.
153
 
Yale’s plan for Chapel aims at an older crowd.154 The main draw in this area, as Yale 
sees it, is the Shubert Theater and a selection of upscale restaurants.
155
 Because of these 
attractions, the area appeals to middle-aged shoppers. For this reason, the University has 
                                                 
150 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, Vice President for New Haven and State Affairs and Campus 
Development, Yale University (Feb. 16, 2011). 
151 Id. 
152 See David Shieh, Broadway Tries To Attract Non-Yalies, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2006/feb/10/broadway-tries-to-attract-non-yalies/. 
153 See, e.g., Aaron Bray, Shop Vacancies Reflect Careful Growth, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 9, 2007), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2007/oct/09/shop-vacancies-reflect-careful-growth/; Rachel Dempsey, Elm 
City Attracts Regional Shoppers, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2007), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2007/feb/28/elm-city-attracts-regional-shoppers/. 
154 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150.  
155 Union League Café at 1044 Chapel is perhaps the most well known restaurant in a Yale property, while Ibiza, 




primarily focused on nicer restaurants, more-expensive clothing stores, primarily for older 
women, and gift shops, establishments it believes this demographic is most interested in.
156
 
Finally, Yale’s plan for Audubon/Whitney has recently gone through some revision. At 
first, the University’s strategy aimed to capitalize on the area’s “arts” theme.157 Thus it had a 
wide variety of tenants, including a southern restaurant, a bike store, a toy shop, yarn and 
furniture stores, and several boutiques.
158
 This plan, however, was a bit of a failure, and nearly 
all these stores have closed.
159
 The primary culprit, it seems, is that the area does not draw 
enough foot traffic because the area’s office workers are only present during weekday hours.160 
Thus the University’s current plan for Audubon sees it becoming “a hub of ‘beauty, health, and 
wellness.’”161 To this end, it hopes to attract more service-oriented businesses that can draw their 
own traffic.
162
 Recent openings of this sort include a salon and a spa.
163
 
3.3.3 Tenant Selection Practices 
Perhaps the most well-known feature of Yale’s real estate program is its careful selection 
of tenants. This began with the University’s redevelopment of Broadway in the mid to late 
1990s, when attracting “anchor tenants” such as Barnes & Noble, J.Crew, and Urban Outfitters 
became a priority.
164
 Yale’s choosiness, however, is not limited to major retailers, but instead 
                                                 
156 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150.  
157 Shieh, supra note 123. 
158 See id. 
159 See Paul Bass, 3 Stores Closing on Audubon, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (May 6, 2008), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/3_stores_closing_on_audubon/. 
160 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. 
161 Jennifer Nadelmann, A Makeover for Audubon Street, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/sep/13/a-makeover-for-audubon-street/ (quoting Abigail Rider, 
University Associate Vice President and University Properties Director). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See James Collins, Broadway District Sees Substantial Upgrade in Last Four Years, YALE DAILY NEWS (May 
17, 2001), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/may/17/broadway-district-sees-substantial-upgrade-in/; Tom 
Sullivan, J.Crew Will Fill Last Broadway Storefront, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2001), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/sep/05/jcrew-will-fill-last-broadway-storefront/. On the importance of 




applies to filling all of its properties. The University does not rent out properties to the highest 




This tenant selection process involves three components. First, the University attempts to 
discover market demand by conducting surveys and focus groups of university affiliates, 
primarily students.
166
 Although this practice was perhaps more common when Yale was first 
selecting tenants for the newly renovated Broadway area, it continues today.
167
 Through this 




Second, the University carefully scrutinizes tenant applicants to ensure that they fit its 
plans for the area. This process apparently produces many casualties, as Yale claims that 
numerous applicants are passed over for every opening.
169
 The criteria the University uses to 
make these decisions are uncertain, mostly consisting of vague statements about “fitting existing 
tenant mixes.”170 But Yale’s considerations are clearly broader than this. Among the tenants 
rejected by Yale was American Apparel, which opened a location in one of the few non-Yale 
properties on Broadway after the University refused to rent it space for unknown reasons.
171
 Not 
                                                 
165 See Bray, supra note 153 (quoting UP’s director of marketing as saying “we wouldn’t go with a bank just 
because it was the highest bidder”).  
166 See Collins, supra note 164.  
167 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150.  
168 This process is often strangely specific. For example, UP determined that Broadway required a Mexican 
restaurant, which led years later to the opening of Bulldog Burrito. See Mark Wiznia, No Rush To Fill Empty 
Storefronts, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2002), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2002/sep/06/no-rush-to-fill-
empty-storefronts/. 
169 Kendra Locke, Stores To Join Chapel Lineup, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9, 2004), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2004/sep/09/stores-to-join-chapel-lineup/.  
170 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. 
171 Egidio DiBenedetto, American Apparel Struggles with Debt, Falling Stock, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/sep/07/american-apparel-struggles-with-debt-falling-stock/. Yale could 
have rejected American Apparel for three obvious reasons: concern over its financial health (the company expanded 
aggressively and perhaps unwisely), concern over its image (it has been criticized for racy advertisements), or 




surprisingly, this selectivity bothers some tenants, particularly those that appeal to lower-income 
demographics, while tenants aiming at a more-upscale market tend to favor this selectivity.
172
  
Third, the University does not merely select from a pool of tenant applicants—it actively 
recruits tenants to come to New Haven. This process involves sending UP recruiters, primarily 
student interns, to nearby urban areas such as New York and Boston, to scout possible tenants 
and convince them to open locations in New Haven.
173
 Many of Yale’s current tenants were 
found in this way, including Gourmet Heaven (from New York),
174
 Blue State Coffee (from 
Providence),
175
 and Thom Browne (from Boston).
176
 Alexander believes that recruitment is the 
most-important element of Yale’s program because it allows the University to affect the supply 
of tenant applicants rather than merely respond to it.
177
 In his estimation, supply is three-fourths 
of the story; Yale’s demand is much less important.178 
While Yale’s tenant selection policies may allow it obtain its preferred mix of tenants 
going forward, when it began managing the Broadway area more actively, it faced a problem: 
many of the existing tenants did not fit its new vision for the area. The University responded in 
three basic ways. First, it simply closed down some tenants by refusing to renew their leases. The 
most well-known example of this is Krauszer’s, a convenience store once located on York Street 
                                                 
172 See Alison Griswold & Everett Rosenfeld, Univ. Properties Remain Vacant, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/feb/05/univ-properties-remain-vacant/ (“‘I like that they’re being 
selective,’ [the owner of Seychelles’] said. ‘I’m not elitist, but the district needs to maintain a certain level.’”) 
173 The best description of this process can be found in Eli Muller, Behind Broadway, One Feisty Student, YALE 
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2001), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/mar/20/behind-broadway-one-feisty-
student/, an interview with Andrea Pizziconi, a student intern and later employee of UP who “discovered” Gourmet 
Heaven in Manhattan. Her trip to New York was specifically for the purpose of bringing a New York deli to New 
Haven.   
174 Id. 
175 Press Release, University Properties, Yale University Properties Welcomes Blue State Coffee to Downtown New 
Haven (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.yale.edu/up/documents/BlueStatePressRelease.pdf. 
176 Marc Winzia, New Women’s Shoe Store To Occupy Spot on Broadway, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2002), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2002/sep/26/new-womens-shoe-store-to-occupy-spot-on-broadway/.  
177 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. 
178 Id. Alexander also stated that the supply of quality local merchants has shrunk significantly in recent years, 
making it more important to attract regional or national retailers, which must be done through recruitment rather 




just south of Elm. Apparently concerned over its dirty appearance and high prices, the University 
announced in late 2000 that the store’s lease would not be renewed.179 Second, Yale moved 
many tenants from prominent locations to less-prominent ones in order to free up the most-
desirable space for anchor stores and attractive retail.
180
 For example, several ground-floor 
barber shops on Broadway were relocated to second-floor spaces, a move Alexander believes 
was crucial to improving retail in the area.
181
 Many of these retailers and service providers 
survived in their new locations, but others did not. Finally, Yale implemented various contractual 
requirements, notably a nine pm closing time for the Broadway district, and increased rent, 
making it economically infeasible for many existing businesses to continue to operate.
182
 
There is one final wrinkle of this tenant selection process worth mentioning now. 
Because Yale has basically no stated criteria for accepting tenants, it can refuse to rent to any 
tenant it pleases. This provides Yale with a relatively easy way of granting certain businesses 
monopoly rights, at least within its properties. One possible example of this is Gourmet Heaven, 
which is the only grocery or convenience store in Yale’s Broadway properties. Because of the 
simple lack of available retail space in the Broadway district, a monopoly within Yale’s 
properties there goes a long way toward ensuring a local monopoly, since few non-Yale 
properties are both available and suitable for a competitor. This not only ensures the economic 
success of Gourmet Heaven, but it also gives the University some ability to extract certain in-
                                                 
179 Donar, supra note 110. As I discuss below, see infra Subsection 3.3.6, there are much more-plausible reasons 
why Krauszer’s lease was not renewed, primarily to facilitate a monopoly for Gourmet Heaven, a store the 
University much preferred. Note that Krauszer’s was not the first convenience-store casualty of Yale’s renovation of 
Broadway. In 1998, the University refused to renew the lease of Store 24, apparently in an effort to “upscale 
Broadway.” Craig Gilbert, City Beautiful, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE, May 21, 1998, at 7.  
180 See, e.g., Paul Bass, Blue Mother, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE, Sept. 30, 1999, at 5.  
181 Id.; Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. The recent move of Celtica from College 
Street to a more-prominent and vacant storefront (the home of the former Copper Kitchen) on Chapel Street, may be 
a recent example of this practice, though in this case to improve the retail mix of Chapel by bringing in a desirable 
tenant rather than moving an undesirable one away.  
182 See Matt Bender, How Many Customers Can One University Serve?, THE YALE HERALD, Oct. 17, 2003, at 1, 6; 




kind payment for these de facto monopoly rights.
183
 American Apparel may be another example 
of this practice, as Yale’s refusal to lease it space may have been in part to protect Urban 
Outfitters, an American Apparel competitor already renting from Yale.
184
 While this may seem 
unusual, as I discuss below, this is an ordinary part of modern shopping center development.
185
 
To get a sense for how much these policies shape the tenant mix of Yale properties, 
consider a few facts about Yale’s tenants. None of Yale’s properties contains a bar. This is easy 
to miss because within Yale’s block of properties on College and Chapel are three bars: Anchor, 
Richter’s, and the Owl Shop. But all of these tenants are in non-Yale properties. A similar 
pattern is found with cheaper restaurants. Broadway contains several of these, such as A-One 
Pizza, the Educated Burgher, and Yorkside, but these are all on non-Yale property.
186
 The story 
is similar on Chapel, where the only greasy spoon in Yale’s holdings, the Copper Kitchen, was 
forced to close after Yale refused to renew its lease.
187
 In fact, the only arguably dingy restaurant 
in all of Yale’s property holdings is Naples, which has been operating for some time and perhaps 
has been spared because it is not located in a retail-focused area. The story is similar with 
convenience stores. In Broadway and Audubon/Whitney, Gourmet Heaven locations are the only 
such establishments in Yale properties. In the Chapel Street district, Yale has only one store of 
this variety, J & B Deli and Grocery, and this store is separated from the remainder of Yale’s 
Chapel Street properties by several non-Yale buildings. All other convenience stores within these 
                                                 
183 For further evidence Gourmet Heaven has been granted a de facto monopoly, as well as the benefits Yale may 
have received in return, see infra Subsection 3.3.6. 
184 See supra note 171. If true, however, this effort failed, as American Apparel was able to secure space in a non-
Yale property.  
185 See infra Subsection 4.1.4. Hoff quotes the owner of Bulldog Burrito as saying that while Yale’s tenant selection 
process is an inconvenience, it is a net positive because it has protected him from competition. Hoff, supra note 102, 
at 64. 
186 Ivy Noodle and Bulldog Burrito are both Yale tenants, but I believe these are more sophisticated (and certainly 
cleaner) even if not substantially more expensive.  





three districts, such as the News Haven on Chapel Street and the Breakaway Deli on Whitney, 
are tenants of landlords other than Yale.  
3.3.4 Basic Lease Structure 
Yale’s leases are in many ways ordinary retail leases.188 Rent terms are the same as those 
in a standard shopping-center lease.
189
 This means they contain two types of rent: a base rent and 
a percentage rent. The percentage rent, or “overage,” is zero for sales below a certain threshold, 
called a “break point.”190 Above this break point, the tenant pays both the base rent and the 
overage. As discussed below, the break point in shopping center leases is generally set at base 
rent divided by percentage rent. This means that if the tenant’s sales are below the break point, it 
pays a higher rent as a percentage of its sales than it would if its sales exceeded the break point. 
Since Alexander maintained that Yale’s leases are completely standard retail leases in terms of 
rent, presumably the break point is set in the same way.
191
 I also assume that Yale, like all 
shopping center developers, sets the overall rate of compensation based on tenant characteristics, 
charging better tenants less in rent.
192
 
                                                 
188 I asked University Properties and Bruce Alexander several times if it would be possible to see a sample Yale 
lease. Alexander told me this would not be a problem, however, I could only see a blank lease to protect the 
confidentiality of their tenants. I was soon contacted by Abigail Rider, who informed me that I could only see this 
blank lease if I first signed a confidentiality agreement promising not to discuss any of the lease’s terms in any 
context. Clearly, such an offer would not have been helpful for writing this paper. When I asked her whether these 
terms were negotiable, she replied that she could not waive them herself and would need to ask Alexander. I have 
still not heard back regarding the blank lease and my attempts to follow up have gone unreturned. I am not sure what 
is more amusing about this episode: that UP was unwilling to show me a standard, blank lease, or that the Director 
of UP apparently lacked authority to do so on her own. Regardless, my discussion of Yale’s leases is not informed 
by the actual content of these leases but instead relies entirely on second-hand statements.  
189 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136. I discuss the structure of shopping center leases 
infra Subsection 4.1.3. 
190 See, e.g., John D. Benjamin, Glenn W. Boyle & C.F. Sirmans, Retail Leasing: The Determinants of Shopping 
Center Rents, 18 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N J. 302 (1990); infra Subsection 4.1.3. 
191 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136. Given how common this structure is in the 
industry, it is extremely implausible that someone with Bruce Alexander’s background would not be aware of it.  




Yale’s leases are unusual in three respects. First, nearly all of Yale leases are for five-
year terms without a tenant option to renew.
193
 The University sometimes, but rarely, allows for 
longer lease terms for restaurants, which often have high up-front costs and thus may want 
greater security.
194
 Second, Yale’s leases typically contain “business purpose” clauses specifying 
what sort of business the tenant will operate in order to prevent an end-run around Yale’s tenant 
selection.
195
 Finally, Yale tenants cannot sublease or assign their leases without Yale’s 
consent.
196
 This limitation also follows from Yale’s tenant selection practices.  
3.3.5 Extended Hours Requirements 
While the structure of Yale’s leases is relatively standard, save for a few terms designed 
to protect its right to select tenants, many of the specific terms of its leases are unusual. Most 
prominent, when Yale redeveloped Broadway, it inserted a provision into all its leases requiring 
tenants to remain open until nine pm six nights a week and six pm on Sunday.
197
 This 
requirement, intended to increase foot traffic at night, improve safety, and enhance retail sales, 
unsurprisingly proved controversial and drove many long-time tenants to move out of Yale 
properties or close.
198
 While Alexander recognizes that some of these concerns were legitimate, 
he believes that most of the tenants who complained about this policy were merely seeking an 
                                                 
193 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136; Hoff, supra note 102, at 68.  
194 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136. Yale also apparently granted longer leases to 
tenants when it was renovating the Broadway district, as Origins signed a 10-year lease in 1998. Edward J. Crowder, 
Cosmetics Store To Open on Broadway, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, June 5, 1998, at A16.  
195 Hoff, supra note 102, at 68. Such clauses give Yale the ability to cancel the lease if the tenant proves to have lied 
during the tenant selection process regarding the nature of its business.  
196 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 136; Hoff, supra note 102 at 69. 
197 Cara Baruzzi, Yale University Drives Downtown Retail Renewal, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Oct. 30, 2005), 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2005/10/30/import/15479564.txt?viewmode=fullstory. 
198 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 153; Tom Sullivan, After Lease Problems, Shoe Store Will Close, YALE DAILY NEWS 




excuse to get out of their lease, which Yale permitted them to do.
199
 This policy continues to 
apply in the Broadway area.  
Unlike Broadway, however, which the University sought to transform through its 
policies, Chapel Street has long been a successful retail and restaurant corridor. Most of the 
tenants in this area were inherited by Yale. Nonetheless, Yale has been inserting similar clauses, 
with a closing time of eight rather than nine pm, as these tenants’ leases come up for renewal.200 
These clauses specify that when a certain number of Yale’s tenants in the area have leases with 
an eight pm provision, Yale can require all such tenants to remain open to this later time. Yale 
has reached this threshold but has so far not instituted a mandatory eight pm closing time and, 
according to Alexander, does not believe it is necessary to do so at this time given that Chapel 
Street is already successful and the imposition of this requirement would likely harm many of its 
smaller businesses, such as boutiques, which are unlikely to benefit from extended hours.
201
 Yale 
has, however, enforced clauses in its Chapel Street leases requiring these tenants to remain open 
on certain holidays.
202
 For now, however, these tenants remain free to set their own hours.  
3.3.6 Other Contractual Micromanaging 
Setting mandatory business hours is not the only detail of tenants’ business operations 
Yale manages by contract. Many of the leases of its restaurant tenants contain terms requiring 
Yale to approve the restaurant’s menu.203 Although this may seem unusual, it is perhaps best 
seen as another contractual term designed to protect Yale’s tenant selection process by 
preventing tenants from changing their menu and thereby the character of the restaurant. 
                                                 








Other forms of contractual regulation are more unique. Three are particularly curious, all 
of which relate to Gourmet Heaven. First, Gourmet Heaven’s lease prevents it from selling 
tobacco products.
204
 Krauszer’s lease, which Yale declined to renew immediately before 
Gourmet Heaven opened, contained no such provision.
205
 As a result, the only business that 
currently sells tobacco product in the immediate Broadway area is a gas station at the 
intersection of Goffe and Whalley, far removed from the ordinary Broadway shopping traffic. 
Eliminating tobacco products from Broadway can be seen either as an effort to change the 
clientele, as shoppers interested in purchasing cigarettes would have no reason to go to Gourmet 
Heaven thereby making it appeal to a different demographic than Krauszer’s,206 or as a sort of 
public welfare regulation designed to improve the cleanliness of Broadway and perhaps the 
health of Yale students. 
Second, Gourmet Heaven’s lease contains an obscure clause imposing a maximum price 
on certain goods. Specifically, it is required at some interval to assess the price of a basket of 
goods at competitors’ stores in the area and ensure that certain hygiene products are sold at an 
“affordable” price.207 This is perhaps the strongest evidence that Gourmet Heaven has been 
granted a de facto monopoly, since it is unclear why Yale would want this provision if it thought 
the market would be operating normally on Broadway. Yale’s inclusion of this term suggests that 
it believed no competitor would open nearby Gourmet Heaven and prevent it from charging 
monopoly prices. And if it believed this, this is likely because it intended to permit no such 
competitor to open. These monopoly rights may have been part of the price Yale paid both to 
woo Gourmet Heaven to New Haven and to induce it to agree to other contractual terms, such as 
                                                 
204 Tom Sullivan, On Yale’s New Retail Strip, Grocery Heaven Is Gourmet, YALE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2001), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2001/mar/27/on-yales-new-retail-strip-grocery-heaven-is/.  
205 Id. 
206 Smoking is obviously correlated with lower social class.  




the ban on tobacco products, that no doubt hurt its sales. The fact that Krauszer’s lease was not 
renewed immediately before Gourmet Heaven opened further suggests a monopoly.
208
 But Yale 
does not want Gourmet Heaven’s monopoly to harm students too much, requiring it to introduce 
additional contractual terms to prevent monopolistic pricing of essential hygiene products.  
Finally, Gourmet Heaven’s lease requires it to display flowers and fruit outside of its 
store unless the weather is too cold.
209
 This clause is best seen as an effort to ensure that 
Gourmet Heaven contributes to the provision of public goods, such as a pleasant streetscape, 
which no doubt improves the atmosphere of the neighborhood. This clause presumably costs 
Gourmet Heaven money, since if this were the most efficient use of Gourmet Heaven’s display 
space the clause would not be needed. I suggest that Gourmet Heaven’s de facto monopoly 
provides implicit compensation for this cost.
210
 
An important question to consider is whether Gourmet Heaven is unique in having a lease 
with these sorts of contractual provisions. Given Yale’s general secrecy, there is no real way to 
know the answer to this.
211
 On the one hand, the nature of Gourmet Heaven’s business may 
expand the scope of externalities it could potentially create. Thus it could be either particularly 
harmful to the area, if it becomes a seedy store like the Krauszer’s it replaced, or it could be the 
beautiful Manhattan deli Yale administrators desired. More likely, however, these sorts of 
clauses are not unique. We merely know about them in the case of Gourmet Heaven because the 
                                                 
208 The non-renewal of Krauszer’s lease was also justified on the grounds that it charged too much for its products, 
while Gourmet Heaven would be a cheaper alternative. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 204. Even if this were so, it is 
quite unclear why not renewing Krauszer’s lease would do more to solve this problem than simply permitting 
Gourmet Heaven to open in addition. Regardless, this hope soon proved to be misplaced, as students realized that 
Gourmet Heaven was, if anything, more expensive than the store it replaced. See id.; Wong, supra note 114. 
209 Baruzzi, supra note 197. It should be noted as well that Gourmet Heaven’s lease requires it to stay open until two 
am, but the store has voluntarily chosen to remain open twenty-four hours, so this provision has no effect. Hoff, 
supra note 102, at 68. 
210 Of course, Yale could have obtained these same concessions from Gourmet Heaven by charging a lower rent. It 
likely chose to compensate Gourmet Heaven by granting it a monopoly instead because preventing the opening of 
additional convenience stores within Broadway is desirable as a means to ensuring the highest sales volume for the 
district. See infra Subsection 4.1.5.  




controversy with Krauszer’s and Yale’s excitement over its opening prompted a lot of Yale Daily 
News articles, which led to looser lips than usual and the disclosure of contract terms that 
probably have many parallels.  
3.3.7 The Problem of Vacancies 
Long-term vacancies are a well-publicized result of Yale’s program, producing a steady 
stream of fluff pieces in student newspapers regarding new store openings and closings and 
more-critical articles questioning the causes of Yale’s apparent inability to fill its properties, 
often sourced with puzzled quotes from other Yale tenants.
212
 While a certain number of 
vacancies in retail property is inevitable and the weak state of the New Haven retail economy has 
produced many vacancies in non-Yale properties, Yale’s properties appear to be particularly 
prone to long-term vacancies, especially in comparison with similar non-Yale properties.  
 
Figure 2: 986 Chapel Street 
                                                 
212 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 153; Griswold & Rosenfeld, supra note 172; Locke, supra note 169; Wiznia, supra 




Perhaps the clearest example of this is Yale’s property at 986 Chapel Street. The 
property, acquired in the Schiavone sale in 1999 and once the home to Schiavone’s New Haven 
Restaurant, has remained vacant for more than ten years.
213
 In early 2010, this property was the 
cause of an unusual exchange, when a New Haven resident used the City’s SeeClickFix website 
to point out the property’s long-term vacancy and asked Bruce Alexander personally to find a 
tenant for this prominent location on the New Haven Green.
214
 Alexander eventually responded 
on the SeeClickFix website, acknowledging that the University had not done as well with this 
property as it deserved and making “a New Year’s resolution to do better in 2010.”215 Alexander 
also observed that “[p]utting a low-quality tenant in my experience is often worse than a vacant 
storefront because it drags down the whole block and makes attracting the better tenants all that 
more difficult.”216 Over the years, the university had shown the space to “literally scores of 
excellent tenants” but had never managed to close a deal because tenants were worried about low 
projected sales in the location.
217
 The history of this property and Alexander’s response to this 
event show that UP is so committed to its tenant selection policies that it would rather have a 
vacant store than a store that does not meet its standards. This preference is not without some 
direct costs to the University. The property has a current assessed value of nearly $700,000, and 
thus has a yearly property tax bill of approximately $30,000. This is to say nothing for the 
opportunity costs of foregone rent. This sort of long-term vacancy, while perhaps an extreme 
case, is far from unique. Many Yale properties, including several in Broadway such as the former 
                                                 
213 Melissa Bailey, Yale Explains “Hideous Storefront,” NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/yale_vp_vows_to_address/. 
214 #14074 Bruce Alexander & Yale, Please do Something! SEECLICKFIX, http://www.seeclickfix.com/issues/14074 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2011). The poster, Edward Anderson, observed that the neighboring property, 976 Chapel, is 
also Yale owned and had been vacant for several years.  






home of Krauszer’s on York and the Davenport College Annex on Elm, have been vacant for at 
least five years and possibly ten.
218
 
UP has responded to the long-term vacancies that result from its tenant selection practices 
in two basic ways. The first is to concentrate vacancies in less-desirable and less-visible 
locations. This is done both by ensuring that new tenants move in to the most-prominent vacant 
property the University owns and by moving existing tenants into these more-visible 
vacancies.
219
 A recent example of this is Celtica, which moved from an isolated Yale property at 
260 College to the recently vacated former location of the Copper Kitchen on Chapel near 
College. The result of this policy is that Yale’s vacant properties are most often found at the 
outskirts of each area it owns.
220
 Second, Yale frequently employs a strategy that one observer 
has called the creation of “Potemkin stores.” Yale places prominent advertisements for its other 
tenants in the windows of vacant stores, often designed to look to the casual observer like an 
actual store is in the location. This practice has two benefits. First, as mentioned, it may deceive 
the unwary into thinking the property is not vacant, thereby avoiding some of the negative 
externalities of vacancy. Second, it provides a form of implicit compensation to tenants whose 
business may be harmed by a neighboring vacancy in the form of free advertising.  
3.3.8 Conflicts with Tenants and Yale’s “Iron Fist” 
A final puzzling and controversial element of Yale’s behavior in the management of its 
real estate program is its frequent confrontations with tenants, which have led some to view it as 
having an “iron fist.” The story here is much like with vacancies: a certain amount of 
                                                 
218 Yale has finally found a tenant for the former Krauszer’s location. Jack Wills, a UK clothing chain known for its 
preppy aesthetic, will soon open in the location. Sharon Yin, Jack Wills To Bring Brit Prep, YALE DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/mar/01/jack-wills-to-bring-brit-prep/. Student reaction 
appears to be mixed, in large part because the store’s target demographic is very similar to that of Gant and J.Crew.  
219 Obviously, tenant demand also contributes to this dynamic, as new tenants no doubt prefer to move into the most-
promising property available while existing tenants may be willing to upgrade.  
220 For example, in Broadway, the southern-most and northern-most Yale-owned properties on York are vacant, 




confrontation between tenants and a landlord is inevitable. But as with vacancies, one 
particularly extreme incident suggests that Yale may be somewhat less flexible than a typical 
landlord, or at the very least is not obviously more interested in maintaining positive relations 
with seemingly desirable tenants when doing so imposes costs on Yale. 
The incident in question is the conflict between Yale and the owners of the restaurants 
Roomba and Bespoke.
221
 Before this conflict, Roomba was a quite popular restaurant in one of 
Yale’s properties at 1044 Chapel Street, which had opened in 1999.222 In 2003, its owners, the 
Franco-Camachos, leased a non-Yale property at 266 College and began renovating it to create a 
second restaurant with living space on the upper floors.
223
 Soon after this, a dispute emerged 
between the Franco-Camachos and Yale regarding ownership of a small walkway behind the 266 
College property on which the Franco-Camachos had placed a storage shed. While this dispute 
was ongoing, Roomba’s lease expired in 2005, and it continued to operate, paying month-to-
month rent.
224
 Yale and the Franco-Camachos attempted to negotiate a new two-year lease, but 
according to the Franco-Camachos, Yale’s terms were unreasonable, including a requirement 
that they agree not to open another downtown restaurant.
225
 If this is true, it is unclear whether 
Yale’s motive for this term was to prevent the Franco-Camachos from acting to diminish the 
success of Roomba or whether this was merely a negotiating tactic to secure a concession 
regarding ownership of the disputed walkway. In 2006, the Franco-Camachos opened their new 
restaurant, Bespoke, at the 266 College property. Around this same time, then-UP Director 
David Newton and a Yale lawyer met with the Franco-Camachos and entered into an agreement 
                                                 
221 Reconstructing this event is quite difficult because there is no impartial narrator but merely a series of newspaper 
articles written after the fact recounting the events from the perspectives of the parties.  
222 Cara Baruzzi, Downtown Restaurant To Close over Lease Dispute, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (June 2, 2007), 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2007/06/02/import/18417616.txt?viewmode=fullstory. It is unclear whether 







according to which Bespoke would have access to the alley and be able to use the shed in 
question for at least two years.
226
 This agreement, however, was not to Bruce Alexander and 
other Yale officials’ liking, so they immediately tried to repudiate it, arguing that Newton lacked 
authority to make such an agreement.
227
 This led to a lawsuit between the Franco-Camachos and 
Yale, during the course of which, Yale evicted Roomba, explicitly because the Franco-Camachos 
were unwilling to concede ownership of the walkway and continued to assert the validity of the 
agreement in court.
228
 This lawsuit is still ongoing, with the Franco-Camachos having won at 
both the trial and appellate court levels, but Yale apparently pursuing an appeal to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court.
229




While there are obvious perils in taking these newspaper reports as an accurate history of 
events, it does demonstrate two curious details about Yale’s behavior. The first is that, as 
suggested above,
231
 University Properties apparently has very limited discretion and authority. 
Second, Yale is very protective of what it sees as its rights and is not above playing hardball to 
get what it wants, even if this includes losing very successful tenants.
232
 As a result, scattered 
quotes in newspaper articles suggest that the University and Alexander have a reputation for 
having an “iron fist” and “intimidating” tenants.233 Similar aggressive behavior can be seen in 
Yale’s handling of the Broadway redevelopment and the institution of new policies that 
                                                 
226 Victor Zapana, After Local Judge Rules in Favor of Bespoke, Yale Plans To Appeal, YALE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 20, 
2008), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2008/feb/20/after-local-judge-rules-in-favor-of-bespoke-yale/. 
227 Yu, supra note 129. Newton “retired” in September of 2006. Id. 
228 Andrew Mangino, Roomba To Close After Dispute with Univ., YALE DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2007), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2007/jun/05/roomba-to-close-after-dispute-with-univ/. 
229 Ed Stannard, Restauranteurs Score Second Win vs. Yale, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Jan. 5, 2010), 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/01/05/news/new_haven/a3-nebespoke.txt?viewmode=fullstory.  
230 Id. 
231 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
232 The Roomba space has not been filled since the restaurant’s departure and remains vacant today.  
233 Yu, supra note 129. This specific quote comes from Joel Schiavone, who has a long history of conflict with Yale, 




accompanied it. Yale’s behavior at that time left several decades-long tenants quite upset.234 
Disputes with tenants in the Audubon area have also been reported.
235
 While too much should 
not be made of these incidents, as some disputes between landlords and tenants are bound to 
occur, they are useful to keep in mind as a corrective against any temptation to view Yale as a 
benevolent actor.  
3.3.9 Merchant Associations and Public Goods 
Certain services are provided to Yale’s tenants by business improvement districts, 
merchants associations, and UP itself. On Chapel Street, Yale’s properties fall within the Town 
Green Special Services District, a business improvement district that provides various services 
within the downtown area and is funded by property tax contributions.
236
 Because Yale is such a 
significant landowner within the boundaries of the district, it has extraordinarily close ties with 
its operations.
237
 On Broadway, no business improvement district exists, but there is a Broadway 
Merchants Association, which provides many of the same services as a business improvement 
district, such as maintenance to common areas and streets. Yale tenants are contractually 
obligated to pay dues to the Association.
238
 Further, UP directly provides about half of the 
Association’s annual funding, and the Association is staffed and operated by UP.239 
                                                 
234 Dewitt, supra note 53.  
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on attracting tenants to New Haven and particularly Yale-owned properties).  






Information on the budgetary details of Yale’s commercial real estate program is not 
publicly available, and my inquiries in this area met with vague answers. At the very least, the 
transfer of the University’s property from its investments office to ONHSA and UP suggests that 
these properties, like those at Penn and other universities,
240
 do not generate investment-grade 
returns.
241
 In interviews, Bruce Alexander stated without hesitation that UP would readily forego 
higher profits if he believed a particular tenant would produce sufficient externalities to justify 
this decision.
242
 But this statement was ambiguous because he made it in the context of a claim 
that the favorable externalities from a good tenant are captured by neighboring tenants and 
increase their sales. It was thus unclear whether he would forego higher rent for externalities that 
are not captured by neighboring stores, but the general tone of his remarks suggested that he 
would.
243
 However, he then stated that in his mind the University had never had to do so because 
all the externalities he seeks to generate through tenant selection to benefit the University and the 
City of New Haven are also captured by nearby tenants.
244
 
 Gretchen Hoff reports that then-Director of UP David Newton stated in an interview that 
UP’s budget is kept separate from the University’s as a whole, and the office is entirely self-
sufficient.
245
 He further stated that UP generally provides some revenue to the University.
246
 This 
may still be true. We should, however, keep in mind the obvious point that while UP may be 
kept separate for matters of accounting, it is clearly “too big to fail.” If its revenues ever fell 
                                                 
240 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.  
242 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. 
243 As I discuss later, it is quite clear that the University has in fact done this, see infra Section 4.3, so closely 
parsing his statement is unnecessary.  
244 This is clearly false, or at least misleading, since the benefits of the externalities captured by other Yale tenants 
cannot be equal to the costs of some decisions. See infra Section 4.2. 





short of costs, Yale would surely cover the difference. Thus while it may for the most part act as 
an independent entity, the decisions of UP are no doubt influenced by this implicit financial 
backstop provided by the University.  
3.3.11 Influence of Other Universities’ Programs 
Despite the rather large number of newspaper articles written on Yale’s commercial real 
estate program and University Properties, I have not found a single article asserting that the 
University’s program has been influenced by the programs of any other universities. Several 
articles suggest that Yale’s activities have influenced other universities, such as Penn and 
particularly Case Western.
247
 In an interview, Bruce Alexander stated that Yale’s program had 
not been informed by programs at any other universities but instead its policies were the result of 
his own private-sector experience.
248
 While at first glance, this may seem implausible, 
particularly given many of the similarities between Yale’s efforts and those of Columbia and 
Penn, it may be true, as Yale’s program is nearly identical to the methods employed by modern 
shopping center developers.
249
 While universities’ programs are quite similar, this may be more a 
matter of universities independently imitating private developers than each other. 
3.4  Other Major Initiatives To Improve New Haven 
Before assessing whether Yale’s program has met its goals, I should note that Yale’s 
investment in commercial real estate is but one element of a much broader effort to improve the 
New Haven area. Like Penn, Yale also has programs designed to improve New Haven’s schools, 
boost the local economy, enhance public safety, and to increase the quality of New Haven’s 
housing. In interviews, Bruce Alexander stated that in his mind, Yale’s commercial real estate 
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program was perhaps the most-important element of Yale’s broader effort.250 He also believes it 
is the most-visible program and has had the greatest impact on the City’s image.251 
 While this paper will not discuss these programs, it is important to remember that their 
existence may influence commercial real estate. Yale’s rental housing is particularly significant 
here. Yale owns more than 500 residential units. A significant portion of these units are in the 
same areas as Yale’s commercial real estate. Further, many of Yale’s commercial properties are 
actually mixed-use developments, with ground-floor retail and apartments on the upper floors. 
This coexistence of commercial and residential property certainly influences Yale’s decisions 
regarding its commercial real estate, since the effects of particular tenants are not only felt by 
neighboring retail tenants but also by residential ones. Throughout this paper, I have ignored this 
complexity because it would be simply too difficult to integrate these considerations in a 
systematic way. It should be kept in mind, however, that the inclusion of residential housing as a 
factor influencing Yale’s decisions may sometimes be important. 
4  AN INTERNAL ASSESSMENT OF YALE’S PROGRAM 
Yale University believes that its efforts to improve New Haven through investing in 
commercial real estate have been quite successful, and many members of the New Haven 
community apparently agree.
252
 University officials credit the program with improving New 
Haven in three ways. First, they believe it has greatly improved safety, particularly in the 
Broadway district.
253
 Second, it has improved the image of New Haven, both among those within 
the greater New Haven area and among potential students.
254
 The University conducts regular 
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surveys among these groups and has found that over the past decade, suburban residents are 
more favorable disposed toward the city while the importance of New Haven as a factor 
influencing prospective students’ decision to attend Yale has diminished.255 Because, as noted 
above, the University sees its commercial real estate program as the most visible of its efforts to 
improve New Haven, it attributes these gains largely to its investments in this area.
256
 Finally, 
Yale administrators think that their successful development and management of commercial real 
estate, particularly in the Broadway district, has served as a model for private developers and 
spurred additional private investment.
257
 
While these assessments of Yale’s program are nice, they are also unsatisfying. 
Obviously, it is impossible to create empirically ironclad evaluations of how Yale’s program has 
affected New Haven. But it is certainly possible to go about making this judgment in a more-
rigorous way. I will attempt this in two steps. In this Part, I will try to determine whether Yale’s 
program has been successful in its own terms, that is, whether it has met its own goals and 
aspirations. Then in the final Part of this paper, I will consider whether Yale’s plans and the 
degree to which it has fulfilled these plans are good for New Haven more broadly.  
The first step in assessing Yale’s program from this internal perspective is to come up 
with a theory of Yale’s actions. While it is not difficult to find statements from University 
officials regarding what Yale is trying to accomplish, I regard these as minimally useful. Instead, 
my approach will be to use the models introduced in Part 2 to explain the University’s 
development practices. Which of these models best accounts for Yale’s behavior as described in 
                                                 
255 Id. To my knowledge, these surveys are internal and are not publicly available.  
256 Id. 




Part 3? While there is necessarily a high degree of judgment in this task,
258
 I will argue that the 
political institution model best accounts for Yale’s behavior, but there is also strong evidence of 
high agency costs within Yale’s program.259 Because both of these explanations posits that 
Yale’s behavior systematically departs from its best interests, which is defined as the aggregated 
best interests of its affiliates, I will then consider how far political forces and agency problems 
distorts the University’s policy away from what is optimal from an internal perspective.  
4.1  Yale as Private Developer 
According to the university as private developer model, universities invest in commercial 
real estate because they have many of the traits needed to be a successful real estate developer.
260
 
They have access to large amounts of capital, know the demands of desirable demographics, 
have long-standing ties with government and community groups, and may be able to benefit 
from the expertise of their graduates at sub-market rates. While this model is ultimately unable to 
account for some Yale’s activities, it is important to consider it in depth because most of the 
decisions Yale has made in the management of its commercial real estate program are identical 
to the decisions that would be made by an experienced and successful private developer with 
Yale’s property holdings. Showing this requires an extended detour into the economics of 
shopping malls, enterprises that have much in common with Yale’s concentrated retail holdings.  
                                                 
258 This is so because there is no simple means to aggregate the interests of Yale’s affiliates in order to arrive at the 
policy that produces the greatest benefits for these affiliates. As such, one can never prove that a particular policy 
does not in fact serve the best interests of Yale’s affiliates as a whole and thus must be the result of dysfunctional 
governance—the political institution model—or opportunism by managers—agency slack.  
259 Recall that the traditional definition of agency costs is the sum of three costs: expenditures by principals to 
monitor their agents, expenditures needed to bond agents to principals, and the loss from suboptimal decisions when 
agents’ actions diverge from their principals’ best interests. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 93, at 308. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, when I refer to high agency costs, I usually have the latter of these three in mind.  




4.1.1 Shopping Externalities 
 Shopping centers exist and succeed for the same reasons that stores tend to cluster 
together, often in dense locations such as a central business district: shopping externalities. 
While other considerations may be relevant to the success of malls and the location of retail more 
generally,
261
 economists have increasingly focused on these demand externalities as the 
dominant factor explaining the success of shopping malls.
262
 Unfortunately, much of this 
literature is disappointing. Much like “ketchup economists,”263 scholars working in this field 
have generally discussed these externalities in a very simplistic way,
264
 apparently concerned 
more with producing models capable of empirical testing than creating models that are 
conceptually satisfying and persuasive. Thus there are few rewards to summarizing this 
literature. Instead, I will present my own account, drawing on these studies when necessary. 
 Shopping externalities come in two basic types. The first of these, I will call “spillover 
effects” or “spillovers,” the stores that generate them “spillover generators,” and the stores that 
benefit from these effects “spillover benefiters.” Spillover externalities are created when a 
shopper travels to store X only to shop at store X, but then sees store Y and decides to shop there 
as well. The second kind of shopping externality I will call “aggregation effects” and the stores 
that generate them “aggregators.” An aggregation effect exists when a shopper would not travel 
to a particular location to shop if only store X or only store Y were at that location, but would 
travel to that same location if both store X and Y were located there.
265
  Aggregation effects are 
the result of two forces: comparison shopping and complementary goods. Shoppers may be more 
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willing to visit a shopping center if it contains competing stores because they can more easily 
compare merchandise.
266
 Similarly, they may be more willing to visit a center if merchants 
complement each other, allowing the shopper to purchase multiple goods he or she needs in one 
trip.
267
 The conceptual difference between these two types of externalities is causal. The 
spillover benefiter can be thought of as a sort of free rider. The shopper visits the shopping center 
entirely because of the existence of the spillover generator, with the benefit accidentally accruing 
to the spillover benefiter. By contrast, when an aggregation effect exists, the stores that generate 
the effect also benefit from it, because the benefiting stores also motivated the shopper’s decision 
to visit the center.
268
  
 A spillover effect is a true externality. In the example above, store X creates an external 
benefit that is enjoyed by neighboring stores: more shoppers. This is a sort of public good, as X 
cannot exclude neighboring stores from this benefit. Without the right institutional structure, X 
will be undercompensated for creating this good, leading to insufficient production.
269
 Thus we 
have a relatively straightforward example of an unpriced benefit. 
 The dynamics of aggregation effects are different, however. Stores X and Y both benefit 
from being located in the same shopping center and thus capture the benefits of their proximity. 
The market failure here is of a different sort. Aggregation effects are likely a diminishing 
marginal good. While the opening of store X next to store Y may generate a large aggregation 
effect—that is, more shoppers travel to the stores when they are located together than the sum of 
those who would travel to each store if they were separate—the addition of a third store, store Z, 
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likely produces a smaller aggregation effect than did the opening of the second. At some point, 
then, the marginal benefit of an additional store (the additional aggregation effects it generates) 
exceeds the marginal cost of that store to existing stores (the reduction in profits from greater 
competition). But the additional store only bears the average costs, not the marginal costs, of 
locating in the shopping center. Thus if entry into the shopping center is unrestricted, competing 
and complementary stores may be overprovided in the shopping center.
270
  
 Retail tenants vary in the degree to which they create these externalities. Some generate 
neither, some only one, and some both. A fast food restaurant is an example of a tenant that 
likely generates neither externality: shoppers travel to the restaurant, purchase their food, then 
leave. Rarely will they shop at other stores after they have eaten and rarely will the presence of a 
fast food restaurant plus store X generate a shopping trip that would not have been generated by 
store X or the fast food restaurant alone. Department stores are often large spillover generators, 
since many shoppers will travel to a center merely to visit a department store, but then shop 
elsewhere.
271
 Smaller clothing retailers are likely to be aggregators, as shoppers will travel 
further to a location with multiple competing and complementary stores of this type than they 
would to a center with only one such store. And both of these store types may, or may not, 
generate externalities of the other type in addition, depending on the circumstances.  
 Retail tenants also vary in how much they benefit from these externalities. For example, 
while fast food restaurants generate few externalities of either type, they are likely to benefit 
greatly from spillovers, as customers who shop at a large department store may choose to stop 
off at an adjacent restaurant for a treat. Other retailers, for example car dealerships, are so 
                                                 
270 George Tolley has argued that this same dynamic will result in excessively large and congested cities, since new 
residents only bear average congestion costs, not marginal congestion costs. George S. Tolley, The Welfare 
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specialized that they are unlikely to benefit at all from spillovers.
272
 Few people visit store X, see 
a car dealership nearby, and decide to buy a new car on the spot. When it comes to aggregation 
effects, it is logically the case that a tenant can only benefit from an aggregation effect to the 
extent it generates it.
273
 Thus while a tenant can be a free rider or a public goods provider in the 
area of spillovers, no such distinction exists in the context of aggregation effects.  
Finally, it is important to note that whether a spillover or aggregation effect is generated 
depends on the specific combination of the stores in the shopping center; it is not an immutable 
trait of any store to generate such effects.
274
 In order to generate and capture these benefits, 
stores must appeal to the same basic demographic. Thus while X and Y may generate an 
aggregation effect when paired together, X and Z may not if their products will not appeal to the 
same shoppers. The same is true of spillovers. While store Y may benefit from X’s spillovers, a 
store that targets a very different demographic may not benefit at all. This dynamic means that 
externalities are likely to be much greater if neighboring stores appeal to the same customers.  
4.1.2 The Efficient Shopping Center 
 With these considerations in mind, we can construct a model of the efficient shopping 
center. I define the efficient shopping center as one that generates the highest total profits for the 
stores that make it up. The center will be efficient when spillover and aggregation effects are 
                                                 
272 However, because car dealers sell a good that customers will comparison shop for, they are an excellent example 
of aggregation effects. Hence they tend to cluster. They also provide an intuitive example of the diminishing 
marginal benefits of aggregation. While car dealers clearly like clustering to an extent, we can easily imagine that at 
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two externalities here: an aggregation effect benefiting both stores and a spillover created by store Y that benefits X. 
As this point shows, I am implicitly defining “benefit” not as higher sales but rather as a higher opportunity for 
sales. Stores X and Y can contribute equally to the causal motivation of shoppers to travel to the center without 
necessarily enjoying the same sales as a result (if, say, X is particularly poor at product placement and thus does not 
capture as many sales as it should from the volume of customers in the door).  
274 See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner, Inter-Store Externalities and Space Allocation in Shopping Centers, 7 J. REAL EST. 




correctly priced, that is, priced so that they are provided until the marginal benefits equal the 
marginal costs. Achieving an efficient shopping center thus requires three institutional 
arrangements. First, there must be some way for spillover benefiters to compensate spillover 
generators in order to ensure that spillovers are not underproduced. Second, controls on 
aggregators must be imposed so that the number of aggregators is set at an efficient level, where 
marginal benefits equals marginal costs, rather than at a level where average benefits equals 
average costs, which is what an unrestricted market is likely to provide. Third, because space in 
the shopping center is limited, stores that create or benefit from spillovers will compete for space 
with stores that generate and benefit from aggregation effects. If the center’s tenants generate 
large spillovers, a store that benefits from spillovers but creates no aggregation effects may 
outbid a store that would generate a large aggregation effect and provide greater aggregate 
marginal benefits to the center. Thus those stores in the center that would benefit from the 
marginal aggregation effect generated by an additional tenant of a certain type must find some 
way to subsidize the rent of the beneficial tenant, or deter the addition of free-riding spillover 
benefiters, so that the optimum level of aggregation effects is created.   
4.1.3 Shopping Center Contracts 
While it is possible that the efficient shopping center could be created through ad hoc 
bargaining between stores, an alternative exists with much lower transaction costs: concentrating 
ownership of the shopping center in the hands of one developer. This allows the developer to 
serve as a common agent, with his or her principals, the retail tenants of the center, coordinating 
their behavior through the developer by means of contracts.
275
 Because spillovers and 
aggregation effects generated by the stores within the center will remain mostly within the 
                                                 
275 See Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Contracting with Spatial Externalities and Agency Problems: The Case of 




confines of the center, the developer has an incentive to maximize sales for the center as a 
whole.
276
 The developer can also easily price these externalities. For spillovers, developer can 
simply charge spillover generators lower rent, recouping this loss from higher rent charged to 
spillover benefiters. Thus the spillover effects are correctly priced through price discrimination 
in rent. The developer can also ensure an efficient number of aggregators by refusing to rent to 
an additional tenant of a certain type when the marginal costs of an additional tenant of that type 
exceed the marginal benefits in terms of greater aggregation effects. And the developer can 
simply refuse to rent to spillover benefiters, thereby preventing them from crowding out more-
efficient aggregation-effect stores. Finally, through careful tenant selection, the developer can 
ensure that the tenant mix best captures spillovers and generates the largest possible aggregation 
effects. 
Efficiency is aided to a lesser degree by the structure of retail leases. Tenants in shopping 
centers pay two types of rent: a base rent and an overage.
277
 The overage is a percentage rent that 
the tenant pays in addition to the base rent when the tenant’s sales exceed a threshold, called a 
break point.
278
 Total rent is thus the sum of the base rent and the overage. This break point is 
typically set at the base rent divided by the overage percentage.
279
 As a result, the tenant pays a 
higher rent as a percentage of total sales if the tenant fails to meet the break point level of sales 
than if the tenant exceeds the break point.
280
 While strictly speaking, the landlord would have the 
                                                 
276 I assume that the costs to the developer of each store are proportional to the square footage of space devoted to 
that store. Thus the developer maximizes his or her profits by maximizing sales per square foot. If, however, some 
store types are more expensive for the developer to service than others, the calculation would be more complex.  
277 See, e.g., Benjamin, Boyle & Sirmans, supra note 190, at 302-03.  
278 Actual data on the average terms of retail leases are disappointingly rare. As a rough guide, however, Benjamin, 
Boyle, and Sirmanns’s study of shopping center leases in Greensboro, North Carolina, found average percentage 
rent rates of approximately five percent, with no contract having a rate higher than 10 percent. Id. at 306-07.  
279 Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 275, at 366-67.  
280 Setting the break point in this manner creates an incentive for the store to assure sales of at least the break point 
level, since otherwise it pays high rent as a percentage of sales. Id. at 368. This is important because stores also 




same incentive to maximize total sales of the center from a fixed rent contract as from a 
percentage rent, this arrangement allows landlords and tenants to share risk from low sales
281
 and 
also ensures that the landlord exerts an efficient level of effort on the provision of common 
services, such as safety and cleanliness.
282
 
4.1.4 The Predictions of This Model of Shopping Centers 
These economic forces allow us to explain many features of shopping centers and the 
behavior of developers. First, shopping centers tend to have a few large anchor tenants, such as 
department stores and movie theaters. These tenants occupy a very large percentage of the 
shopping center’s total area, have relatively low sales volume per square foot, and pay extremely 
low rents.
283
 These tenants create enormous spillover and aggregation effects. As a result, one 
study estimated that anchor stores receive a per-square-foot rent subsidy of approximately 
seventy-two percent versus a non-anchor store with a similar sales volume.
284
 
Shopping centers then have a selection of aggregation merchants that also benefit from 
the spillovers generated by the anchor tenants. Some of these tenants, particularly women’s 
clothing stores, may also create some spillovers, and studies show they pay lower rent than many 
                                                                                                                                                             
effort into promotions, store design, etc., this may draw more customers, which has spillover effects on neighboring 
stores. Thus it is in the best interest of the stores as a whole to create incentives for each store not to slack off in 
retailing, since this maximizes the total sales of the center.  
281 Id. at 368-70. 
282 Benjamin, Boyle & Sirmans, supra note 190, at 304. They also note that percentage rents serve as a hedge against 
inflation for the landlord, since rents will automatically rise with inflation. Id. 
283 THE URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, DOLLARS & CENTS OF REGIONAL SHOPPING CENTERS 2004 at 40 (2004). In 2004, 
department stores in large malls paid a median rent of $2.84 and had a median sales volume of $153.15 per square 
foot of retail space. Rent thus constitutes less than two percent of their revenue.  
284 Pashigan & Gould, supra note 262, at 125. This study was based on data from the Urban Land Institute (ULI) 
from the mid 1990s, but that data is nearly identical to the most recent ULI figures. See THE URBAN LAND 
INSTITUTE, supra note 260. The authors of this study note that the apparent size of the externalities generated by 
department stores suggests that the decline of the central business district as a retail destination may have as much to 
do with unpriced externalities as with the rise of the automobile and suburbanization. Pashigan & Gould, supra note 
262, at 140-41. Once an institution emerged that could correctly price these externalities, namely the suburban mall, 
central business districts with fractured ownership could not possibly compete, since they had no way to subsidize 
department stores for the externalities they created. And once the department stores left, the externalities left with 






 Other tenants, such as jewelry stores, are unlikely to generate any spillovers, 
since shoppers who travel to the mall to purchase jewelry are more specialized and unlikely to do 
as much shopping for other merchandise.
286
 They thus pay very high rent.
287
 While data exist on 
average number of these stores in malls, I have found no empirical studies on whether developers 
limit the number of these stores below what would be observed in an unrestrained market. We 
should expect, however, that rational developers would do so, limiting the number of aggregator 
stores to the level where the marginal benefits of an additional store equals the marginal costs.  
Shopping centers contain a few stores that benefit from spillovers but do not generate 
aggregation effects. Empirical data generally show that in planned malls, stores that sell 
inexpensive merchandise—and thus are not prone to comparison shopping—and are not 
obviously complementary with retailers of other types, such as furniture stores, card shops, and 
music retailers, are usually limited to merely one or two stores within a shopping center.
288
 
Further, one study found that in unplanned shopping centers, stores of this variety were more 
common than in planned shopping centers.
289
 This is not surprising. Stores that benefit from 
spillovers but do not generate aggregation effects are likely to be oversupplied within an 
unregulated shopping center for the same reason as aggregation generators are: new entrants to 
the center only bear the average cost, not the marginal cost. Thus to maximize total revenues, 
developers will wish to limit the number of these stores so that marginal cost equals marginal 
                                                 
285 Pashigan & Gould, supra note 262, at 135.  
286 They are, however, likely to comparison shop, and hence jewelry stores benefit from aggregation effects.  
287 According to the ULI, women’s clothing stores in large malls pay a median rent of $22 per square foot, while 
jewelry stores pay a median of $68.05. THE URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, supra note 283, at 40. Thus the median 
jewelry store pays approximately twenty-four times as much rent per square foot as the median department store. 
This indicates how strong the internalization of spillover effects is. Women’s clothing stores and jewelry stores also 
have higher sales per square foot than department stores, but this greater sales volume does not offset the higher rent 
they pay, as each type of store spends approximately eight percent of its revenues on rent, compared with below two 
percent for department stores. Id. 
288 Id. 




benefits, which because they do not generate aggregation effects, will likely occur with one or 
perhaps two stores.
290
 Keeping the number of these free-riding stores low allows for more space 
to be dedicated to aggregation-effect generating stores, which increases the center’s total sales. 
Finally, stores that do not benefit from spillover effects will not be found in shopping 
centers at all. This is because they will be outbid by stores that do benefit from spillovers. Thus 
high aggregation effect generators such as car dealerships and appliance stores, which efficiently 
cluster together, have no reason to be located in malls because they do not benefit from anchor 
tenants and thus will be outbid by the tenants that do.  
4.1.5 Yale’s Behavior Closely Mirrors That of Shopping Center Developers 
Yale’s tenant selection practices closely conform to what is found in modern shopping 
centers. Like a shopping center, Yale’s holdings are very concentrated in a few particular areas. 
Thus like a mall developer, many of the shopping externalities generated by their tenants will be 
captured by their other tenants, making pricing of these externalities through price discrimination 
in rent possible. This explains why Yale made attracting anchor tenants such as Barnes & Noble, 
Urban Outfitters, and J.Crew a priority in its redevelopment of Broadway.
291
  
Yale then supplements these anchor tenants with a selection of aggregation-generating 
merchants tailored to the anchors in each district. In Broadway, where the anchors appeal to 
suburban residents and younger shoppers, Yale has chosen a variety of retailers, primarily 
apparel merchants, who can not only capture the spillovers generated by the anchors but also 
create some aggregation effects among each other. Tenants such as Barrie Ltd. that were not 
well-suited to capturing these spillovers or generating aggregation effects with Yale’s new 
                                                 
290 Two stores may be the efficient number because malls are large, and some spillovers may not be captured with 
only one store because of placement issues.  




tenants because they appealed to different demographics
292
 were systematically driven out of the 
area by higher rents and new leasing requirements.
293
 Similarly, in the Chapel Street area, where 
the main anchors are not retail establishments in Yale-owned properties but instead cultural 
attractions, such as theaters, that draw an older crowd, Yale has maintained and enhanced a 
tenant mix suited to capturing these externalities and maximizing total sales. 
These dynamics also explain apparent monopolies such as Gourmet Heaven. Since stores 
of this nature are neither complementary with others nor benefit from comparison shopping, they 
create no aggregation effects. Thus the efficient number of retailers of this variety in a district is 
one.
294
 Hence Yale ensured that Krauszer’s closed before bringing in Gourmet Heaven, since 
two retailers of this sort would be a waste of space better allocated to stores of a different type.
295
 
Finally, Yale’s desire to maximize total revenues explains its explicit policy of not 
renting retail space to the highest bidder.
296
 The highest bidder for retail space will be tenants 
that have the highest sales volume, which often are fast food merchants.
297
 But tenants with the 
highest sales volume may generate low or no spillovers. Thus it often makes economic sense to 
rent to a tenant that pays lower rent if that tenant creates sufficient externalities to increase the 
sales of other tenants and thus increase the rent those tenants pay.
298
 If all these tenant selection 
decisions are made correctly, Yale would increase total sales volume in its retail districts and 
thus increase rent. By all accounts, this is in fact what has occurred.
299
 
                                                 
292 Barrie’s appealed to an older demographic than typically shops at J.Crew or Urban Outfitters.  
293 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
294 As throughout this Section, “efficient” is defined as maximizing revenue from retail, not in a broader, socially 
optimal sense.  
295 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
296 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  
297 See Griswold & Rosenfeld, supra note 172 (quoting Abigail Rider as saying that fast food restaurants would fill 
New Haven’s shopping districts without UP’s selectivity because they can pay higher rents due to high turnover). 
298 See supra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.  
299 Telephone Interview with Bruce D. Alexander, supra note 150. Of course, there is no way to verify Alexander’s 




4.1.6 Yale’s Extended-Hours Policy 
 Yale’s decision to require its Broadway stores to extend their hours until nine pm 
involves similar concerns. While it may at first appear that imposing such a requirement would 
reduce the rent Yale could charge for its properties, if Yale makes correct decisions on tenant 
selection, total sales could in fact increase more than costs, allowing Yale to charge higher rent. 
As with Yale’s policies in other areas, this seems to have occurred.300 
 Begin by considering whether a store is a winner or a loser from the institution of a 
mandatory nine pm closing time. A store wins from the policy if it does sufficient extra business 
to cover the extra costs of longer hours. A store is a loser if it does not. Some stores will be self-
sustaining under such a policy. That is to say, they will generate enough extra business from 
staying open until nine pm that they will cover the costs of doing so regardless of how late their 
neighbors are open. Such self-sustaining businesses presumably will already remain open until 
nine pm, since it is cost effective for them to do so, so the institution of this policy has no causal 
effect on their actions. Restaurants are a good example of businesses of this type. While they can 
certainly be winners or losers from the institution of the nine pm requirement, as other stores 
staying open later could help or hurt their business, they will stay open past this time even before 
the policy is implemented. 
 But all other stores are only conditional winners from the policy. Since, by hypothesis, 
they are not self-sustaining, they can only be winners if the collective activity of the entire 
neighborhood staying open later generates sufficient externalities that the extended hours 
become profitable. Thus the same factors needed to maximize the size of externalities, primarily 
a complementary selection of tenants, will be implicated here. With the right tenant mix, the 





landlord can act as a common agent of the tenants, overcoming the high transaction costs of 
negotiation by forcing them to set hours that are efficient only if shared by all stores. 
However, there is an added wrinkle here: tenants that create and benefit from externalities 
at one time of day may not do so at another, since different demographic groups are likely to 
shop at different times. Thus while a tenant may contribute to an aggregation effect during the 
day, that same tenant may not generate aggregation effects at night if its customers are unlikely 
to frequent the store during its extended hours. Thus when Yale implemented this requirement, it 
had strong incentives to drive out retail tenants that appealed to customers unlikely to shop at 
night in favor of tenants that would draw night shoppers, since the former class of tenant 
contributed no externalities to other stores and thus made them less profitable, while the latter 
tenant did and thus could make its neighbors winners from the policy. This provides a further 
reason why the University was keen to drive out tenants that appealed to older demographics, 
such as Barrie Ltd. and Quality Wine,
301
 since even if these stores created shopping externalities 
such as aggregation effects during the day, their older customers were unlikely to shop much at 
night meaning that the persistence of such stores hurt the proceeds of its neighbors once the nine 
pm requirement was implemented, and thus dragged down Yale’s rents.302 Because of Yale’s 
success at driving out these tenants, it has apparently managed to increase rents in the Broadway 
area as a result of its nine pm mandatory closing time.
303
 
4.2  The Deficiencies of This Account 
 As the preceding discussion makes clear, many features of Yale’s program that at first 
appear to be bold ideas for improving New Haven may well just be sound business decisions for 
                                                 
301 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
302 It is hardly surprising, then, that J.Press, a non-Yale tenant, to this day is not open in the evening. Even if the nine 
pm requirement pays for itself for Yale’s Broadway tenants, J.Press is unlikely to benefit sufficiently from these 
externalities to cover its costs. See Bender, supra note 182, at 6. 




a landlord with concentrated retail holdings. Tenant selection and the extended hours 
requirement are only two examples. Yale’s investment in public goods, whether more directly 
through the Broadway Merchants Association, or indirectly, such as through Gourmet Heaven’s 
flower displays, are the sort of policies commonly found in shopping centers, where developers 
are presumably only motivated by profits. Even measures such as banning Gourmet Heaven from 
selling tobacco or the relatively short terms of Yale’s leases can be entirely explained in terms of 
maximizing the sales of Yale’s tenants and therefore rent, as the former helps ensure a cleaner 
street while the latter allows Yale to evict tenants whose externality generation falls short of 
expectations. Most of what Yale does in the management of its program, then, is identical to 
what a private developer who held its properties would do. 
 The model of the private developer, however, ultimately breaks down because several of 
Yale’s decisions and actions are simply irrational if we see it as just an ordinary developer 
maximizing profits. The best example is the decision to have a real estate program at all. While 
UP and Yale’s commercial real estate is apparently self-supporting, there is strong reason to 
doubt that it generates investment-grade returns.
304
 The rational real estate developer would no 
doubt stop being a real estate developer entirely if he or she could see greater returns from 
investing his or her time and money elsewhere. Since Yale presumably could sell its real estate 
and invest the proceeds in investments that would generate much higher returns, its commercial 
real estate cannot be explained simply as an investment: the University must have some 
extraneous reason that prompts it to purchase and manage commercial real estate in the first 
place, such as a desire to generate non-shopping externalities that are captured by its non-
commercial real estate. 
                                                 




 Another deficiency with this model is the placement of Yale’s investments. The three 
areas of New Haven in which Yale owns property are all in close vicinity to the Yale campus. It 
is difficult to believe that Broadway, Chapel, and Audubon are really the three streets in New 
Haven with the greatest opportunities for high returns. No doubt the University has chosen to 
invest in these areas precisely because any positive externalities generated by activity in these 
districts are likely to be captured by the school’s non-commercial property. Indeed, when Yale’s 
program was in its infancy and before the arrival of Alexander, it invested nearly $10 million in 
the Ninth Square redevelopment project.
305
 But no similar investment has been made by the 
University in an area as far removed from Yale’s existing holdings since Alexander’s arrival, 
suggesting perhaps a deliberate policy to concentrate on those parts of New Haven where 
improvements from real estate investment would redound to the campus’s benefit.306 
 Another puzzle is Yale’s long-term vacancies. A building like 986 Chapel Street is quite 
difficult to explain from the standpoint of a private developer.
307
 At first, Alexander’s 
justification for this building’s continued vacancy—that the negative externalities generated by a 
bad tenant can harm the area worse than a vacant building—may seem like a plausible 
consideration for a private developer.
308
 But it is quite difficult to believe that repeatedly turning 
away even less-desirable tenants makes economic sense. Yale’s property tax bill on the property 
amounts to approximately $30,000 annually. While the precise percentage rent Yale’s tenants in 
                                                 
305 Katie DeWitt, Ninth Sq. Struggles To Fill Retail Spaces, YALE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2005), 
http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2005/apr/21/ninth-sq-struggles-to-fill-retail-spaces/. 
306 The lack of repetition suggests that Yale now regards its investment in the Ninth Square as a mistake.  
307 See supra Subsection 3.3.7.  
308 This judgment, however, does not have any empirical support. To my knowledge, no economist has attempted to 
estimate the magnitude of externalities for neighboring commercial tenants of vacant retail properties or low-class 
tenants. Intuitively, however, I expect that the negative externalities generated by vacant property are very large, 
probably as large as or larger than anything but the worst commercial use. See infra note 311. Most scholars have 
assumed that the negative effects of vacant properties are very large, but most of these studies look at abandoned, 
not vacant, property, which presumably is much worse. See David T. Kraut, Hanging out the No Vacancy Sign: 
Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1143-51 (1999) (reporting 




the area pay is unknown, the only empirical study of retail leases I am aware of found average 
percentages of five percent, with maximum percentages approaching ten percent.
309
 Assuming 
that Yale’s properties on Chapel pay a similar percentage, a lease that merely covered Yale’s 
annual tax bill on 986 Chapel would need to lower the annual sales of Yale’s other tenants by 
$300,000 a year before passing on such a contract would be justified. This is a difficult figure to 
accept, particularly because the only Yale property on the same block as 986 Chapel is also 
vacant. Moreover, this ignores both the fact that Yale would almost certainly be able to lease the 
property for more than costs and that its existing use as a vacant building certainly imposes some 
externalities already.
310
 It is only plausible that Yale could capture negative externalities of this 
magnitude from an undesirable tenant if there is some additional mechanism, such as New 
Haven’s attractiveness to Yale’s faculty and students, by which these costs are internalized.311 
 In an interview, Alexander explained long-term vacancies as less a function of avoiding 
negative externalities and more the result of UP’s desire to avoid filling a vacant property, a 
limited commodity, with an undesirable tenant, thereby preventing it from renting that space to 
an externality-producing tenant should it come along.
312
 But this explanation does not fare much 
better. Yale has owned the property for more than a decade without a tenant. Given Yale’s five-
year leases, two tenants could have run the complete terms of their leases in the time this space 
has been vacant. In light of this track record, UP’s belief that it must keep the property open in 
order to rent it to a favorable tenant, which is always just around the corner, is unrealistic. It is 
                                                 
309 See supra note 278. 
310 It is hard to imagine what sort of store a block away from Yale’s nearest occupied properties could reduce the 
sales of those tenants by $300,000 a year more than they are already reduced from having two vacant properties 
(that, incidentally, neighbor a bar) in those same locations.  
311 Joel Schiavone, who originally assembled these properties, claims to have made leases at or below costs in order 
to avoid having vacant storefronts during the early days of his Chapel Street development activities. See Branch, 
supra note 110, at 37. This suggests that he viewed vacant stores as creating very large negative externalities for 
neighboring tenants. This quote comes before the outbreak of Schiavone’s dispute with Yale, see supra note 138, so 
there is no obvious reason to doubt the truth of this statement.  




difficult to imagine a private developer maintaining similar optimism in the face of ten years of 
vacancy. Yale’s apparent unwillingness to rethink this policy suggests that some consideration 
besides economic returns to neighboring properties motivates its decisions. 
 It may be that UP and its staff simply lack the time or interest to find a tenant for this 
property. Indeed, Alexander suggested as much in his comments during the SeeClickFix 
episode.
313
 But surely any private developer in this position would sell land he or she could not 
profitably use due to limited resources. Yale’s behavior shows clear signs of a “Deck of Playing 
Cards” approach. While it acquires property all the time, it never seems to sell it for any 
reason.
314
 Thus it is quite clear that while Yale may mostly behave as a private developer would, 
many of its decisions, notably the acquisition, tenant selection, and disposal, of Yale’s property 
would clearly be irrational for any private developer, since the negative externalities captured by 
neighboring Yale tenants could not possibly be so large as to make these policies efficient.  
4.3  Yale as Secondary Investor 
 These puzzles largely disappear if we instead see Yale as a secondary investor. As 
discussed above,
315
 this theory of university behavior sees it as an actor with enormous, illiquid 
investments in an industry other than real estate. As such, it is economically sound for the 
University to make certain investments that, while locally perhaps money losers, are global 
money winners because they create externalities captured by the universities’ primary operations. 
On this model, Yale invests in commercial real estate because it believes it will generate 
investment-grade returns, only not directly through rent, but indirectly through a university that 
                                                 
313 See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.  
314 Puzzling, long-term vacancies are hardly unique to Yale’s commercial real estate program. For example, Yale 
has owned the building at 33 Dixwell Avenue since 1983. This property is currently a vacant apartment building in 
such a bad state that the casual observer may falsely believe it to be outright abandoned. The property across the 
street, listed as 27 Dixwell Avenue in the New Haven tax database, was purchased on the same day as 33 Dixwell. 
But it has been extensively renovated, rechristened 104 Lake Place, and rented to Yale affiliates through Elm 
Campus Partners. I have no idea why 33 Dixwell has not received similar treatment.  




is more attractive to potential students and faculty. This effect will be strongest if Yale invests in 
areas close to campus, where its existing holdings can capture favorable externalities. The 
externalities Yale seeks to generate through its commercial real estate, then, are not the shopping 
externalities mentioned above, but rather favorable characteristics such as an attractive, 
appealing, and safe area surrounding the campus. And Yale never sells property because doing 
so serves its long-term interests. Yale is in it for the long haul, and it is hard to predict when 
today’s vacant land or useless commercial property will suddenly become valuable for university 
expansion or commercial and residential development.  
 This model still struggles, however, to explain long-term vacancies. While it is plausible 
that the negative externalities that would be generated by a bad retail tenant at 986 Chapel would 
be felt by Yale students and faculty and thereby reduce the appeal of the University as an 
institution, it is unlikely that the externalities generated by any plausible land use could be so 
harmful. As noted, Yale pays nearly $30,000 a year in taxes on the property, and vacant 
buildings generate more than a few negative effects on their own.
316
 It is hard to believe that the 
costs of a convenience store or cell-phone retailer on the well-being of Yale’s affiliates would 
really be this negative. Yale may be operating here under an implicit assumption that the 
negative externalities of a bad retail tenant or a vacant store are only felt in a small radius, while 
the positive benefits of a particularly desirable use, say a popular restaurant, can be felt 
throughout a much greater area. This theory seems plausible, and would seem to be supported by 
Yale’s practice of moving and placing tenants to ensure that vacancies are only found on the 
outskirts of its commercial districts. I will return to this issue shortly.  
 Using this model also helps explain why the University’s properties target the 
demographics they do. Broadway’s college-age appeal, Chapel Street’s theater-goers, and 
                                                 




Audubon’s service shops for professionals all resemble demographics well represented at Yale. 
It should be clear from the discussion of externalities in the shopping-center context that the 
ability of one tenant to capture the externalities generated by another is the result of the two 
tenants’ complementarity. It should not be surprising, then, that Yale has chosen to develop its 
properties toward demographic groups that make up Yale, since this enables Yale affiliates to 
enjoy personally the externalities generated by the University’s real estate. As a result, retail 
establishments appealing to certain demographic groups, such as less-educated, native New 
Haveners, are a market Yale has no interest in tapping, since Yale affiliates can only feel the 
negative externalities of these establishments, never the positive ones.
317
 
  These considerations explain why so much of Yale’s behavior can be accounted for with 
the private developer model. Because Yale has deliberately tailored its commercial real estate to 
complement the demographics of Yale, the same externalities that benefit these commercial 
tenants will also benefit Yale affiliates and thereby Yale, while externalities harmful to these 
tenants are harmful to Yale. Thus even though Yale’s behavior is not actually aimed at 
maximizing the rent from its retail properties, the same methods are useful for Yale’s broader 
goals. It can act as if it is a private developer because doing so achieves the ends of Yale’s 
program, even though Yale itself is motivated by concerns unlike those of the private developer.  
4.4  Yale as Political Institution 
 Before simply accepting the secondary investor model, we should consider more 
carefully our final model: the political institution model. The predictions of this account are quite 
similar to the secondary investor model. It forecasts that Yale will adopt real estate policies to 
maximize the best interest of its affiliates. But unlike the secondary investor model, which 
                                                 
317 In an interview, Bruce Alexander used dollar stores as the go-to example of a tenant that, while not per se 
objectionable, does not fit Yale’s vision. He used tattoo parlors as his example of per se bad tenants. Telephone 




expects the university to adopt those policies that achieve the best interests of the university’s 
affiliates in aggregate, the political institution model predicts that the university will maximize 
the best interests of those affiliates who are most able to organize within the university to 
advance their interests. Those affiliates who are less able to promote their causes, that is who 
operate at a political disadvantage, are likely to see their interests harmed because of this 
differential political power within the university. I believe this is a better model of the 
University’s behavior because it includes all of the above points as well as explaining several 
nagging questions about Yale’s behavior. 
 At first, one could be tempted to dismiss the political institution model out of hand. Since 
it predicts that Yale will adopt those policies that favor its most powerful groups of affiliates at 
the expense of less powerful groups, it would seem to be falsified unless we can locate some 
harm from the program to the least powerful of Yale’s affiliates. And no such harms seem to 
exist. There is no real evidence that Yale’s investments in commercial real estate or the decisions 
it has made in managing these properties have affirmatively harmed the interests of any group of 
affiliates: students, alumni, faculty, or administrators.  
 But this is a strained understanding of the political institution model. A better approach is 
to think of opportunity costs: has Yale adopted policies that, while beneficial to all groups, 
deliver greater benefits to more-powerful affiliate groups than alternative policies that would be 
more beneficial to the affiliates in aggregate. And here the evidence is much stronger. Before 
discussing this, however, we should think about what affiliate groups are more and less 
powerful. I will assume, with only a brief argument, that faculty and administrators can more 
easily advance their interests within Yale’s political system than can students and alumni. This 




that may exceed the ties of students, who are more diffuse and dissimilar. Faculty and 
administrators have decades-long relationships with the University, whereas students are only 
students for a few years. Once students graduate and become alumni, they have even greater 
obstacles to organizing and furthering their interests, notably distance and problems of rational 
ignorance about what is happening at Yale. These dynamics suggest that under a political 
institution model, we should expect Yale’s policies to most benefit its faculty and administrators, 
while benefiting its students and alumni less than alternative policy decisions would.   
 An example of this is Yale’s focus on certain demographic groups. As noted, Yale has 
deliberately chosen to focus its retail districts on demographic groups similar to University 
affiliates so that these affiliates can benefit from the externalities generated by these retailers.
318
 
But this is under-determinative. There are many possible visions for a neighborhood that would 
generate externalities captured by the University. A satisfying account must go further and 
explain why the University has chosen to appeal to the markets it has: suburban shoppers in 
Broadway and older demographics on Chapel.
319
 Many college campuses are surrounded by 
commercial districts with heavily student-centered establishments, such as cheap restaurants, 
college bars, bookstores, and coffee shops. These neighborhoods are often vibrant and safe 
because they attract a steady stream of students nearly twenty-four hours a day. But Yale’s 
management of Broadway and Chapel suggests a conscious desire to avoid creating such areas, 
as relatively few Yale tenants fall into this category. Instead, Yale favors retail tenants, 
particularly upscale clothing retailers that appeal to suburban shoppers. It is not obvious that 
Yale’s vision for Broadway would be less successful at generating public goods captured by the 
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319 The former is more important than the latter because Yale inherited many of its Chapel Street tenants and thus 




Yale community, particularly students, than a more-typical college neighborhood would.
320
 But 
it is easy to see that certain Yale affiliates, notably older administrators and faculty, probably 
benefit much more from the area’s current focus than they would from a hypothetically student-
centered one. This may be the result of differential political power within the University, as 
Yale’s faculty and administrators can shape its policies to favor their own interests against 
hypothetical policies that may be more beneficial to students.
321
 
 More fundamentally, we may ask why Yale has a real estate program at all. Yale could 
easily sell its properties and use the proceeds for other purposes. Or it could maintain its 
properties and manage them as a pure investment, maximizing revenue just like a private 
developer and spending the revenue generated on other activities. The real opportunity-cost 
question of Yale’s program is not whether the way it currently manages this program is the result 
of differences in political power within the University but rather whether having a program at all, 
as opposed to spending the money otherwise, is a result of these forces. It is here that the 
strongest case can be made for seeing Yale’s commercial real estate as the result of political 
forces and not the University’s best interest. Faculty and administrators, who will live within the 
New Haven area for decades and often make significant real estate investments themselves in the 
city, certainly benefit if the University’s investments can improve New Haven. Indeed, given 
their personal stakes in New Haven, they may well favor quite high expenditures toward this 
end. But students, whose time in New Haven is quite limited and often sheltered within the 
                                                 
320 Broadway’s lack of student bars or late night restaurants and heavy reliance on retail means that it has few 
visitors after nine pm. The few establishments that fall into the former category, such as Toad’s or Yorkside, are 
nearly all in non-Yale properties. A different vision for the area thus may well generate more “eyes on the street” 
well into the night, producing significant public safety benefits.  
321 There is strong support for this argument in the pages of the Yale Daily News. Over the years, it has published 
dozens and dozens of articles in which students complain that the University cares too much about attracting rich, 
suburban shoppers, rather than appealing to students’ needs and interests. Students’ desires for more-affordable food 
options are particularly prominent. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 182, at 6; Daniel Weisfield, On Broadway, Past 





colleges, and alumni, whose time in New Haven is at an end, have much less to gain. Students 
and alumni may benefit indirectly from improvements in the quality of life of faculty and 
administrators achieved through investing in New Haven, but this effect is likely quite small. 
Students and alumni may well be better served by allocating this money toward something else, 
such as improved class offerings, more faculty members, or better athletic facilities.
322
   
 In the end these are empirical questions. There is no easy way to measure the aggregated 
best interests of a university’s affiliates and to empirically determine whether the university’s 
policies are perfectly tailored toward achieving those interests. The disparate gains to faculty and 
administrators from Yale’s policies could be efficient. They could benefit all affiliates more than 
any other use of these resources, particularly if they create indirect gains to students and alumni 
from efficient in-kind compensation to the University’s most-important employees. This is 
something we simply do not know and cannot easily discover. This uncertainty itself suggests 
that the political institution model may well be right. Given that it is essentially impossible for 
Yale to assess the long-term costs and benefits from investing in real estate and managing it as it 
does, the secondary investor model would suggest that Yale would be unwilling to undertake 
these investments, instead preferring alternative policies that have more-foreseeable and readily 
calculated benefits for the University’s affiliates. Instead, Yale has chosen to allocate significant 
resources toward a program that clearly benefits its most powerful affiliate groups but has less-
certain gains for the least powerful. On the political institution model, this outcome is no puzzle 
at all.  
                                                 
322 Real estate investments thus may be similar to universities’ accumulation of large endowments. Henry Hansmann 
has questioned whether such large endowments are a rational policy and suggested (among other explanations for 
this practice) that they may do more to advance the best interests of administrators and faculty than current and 




4.5 Agency Slack 
 Finally, assessing Yale’s program requires us to think about agency costs. The nature of 
Yale’s activities suggests that these are likely to be high. The problem, in short, is that the 
administrators running Yale’s real estate program inevitably have a lot of discretion. They must 
make countless decisions about what tenants to select, how much rent to charge, what contractual 
terms to insist on, etc. In this, they are no different from an ordinary real estate developer. But 
the real estate developer has one enormous advantage over his or her peers at Yale. The 
developer’s objective is quite simple: maximizing revenue. And it is subject to easy empirical 
assessment, as the developer can measure the results of his decisions, say of selecting a particular 
tenant, on total rent to inform future actions. If the developer should prove to be unable to do so 
well, he will not be a developer for long. But Yale administrators’ objectives are much more 
complicated because their investments in real estate are merely a means to advancing the 
University’s primary activity. This makes it effectively impossible to empirically assess the 
ultimate effects of specific decisions, to compensate for noise,
323
 and to improve the University’s 
policy based on these insights.  
 The result of this is that the Yale affiliates whose best interests the managers of Yale’s 
real estate are supposed to be serving cannot monitor these agents based on outcomes, but only 
based on their decisions. This is a major disability for effective monitoring. A shareholder at a 
public corporation, say, need not assess every decision the managers of that corporation make; he 
can rely on outcomes, the firm’s profits as compared with its rivals, to at least indirectly judge 
whether his managers are serving his interests and to discipline them if not. Yale affiliates, 
                                                 
323 If New Haven’s quality improves and the University’s appeal is enhanced as a result, is this due to Yale’s 
program or exogenous factors? Note that the last decade has seen significant gains in the quality of life in cities 
generally and a corresponding increase in demand for urban living. Thus Yale’s program has been operating in a 




however, can only police the managers of Yale’s real estate to ensure similar faithfulness to their 
wishes by monitoring actual decisions, because there is no objective means to measure success. 
 This gives rise to four serious agency problems. First, it likely makes the managers of 
Yale’s program too risk averse. Yale affiliates are busy people. They cannot closely follow 
everything University Properties does. Many of University Properties’ decisions they are 
incapable of observing at all, such as decisions not to rent to a particular tenant. And among the 
affirmative decisions UP makes, Yale’s affiliates are much more likely to notice and respond to 
decisions that seem to produce undesirable results than to decisions that produce positive ones. 
Thus UP will likely favor renting to tenants that will be uncontroversial than to take a chance on 
renting to a tenant that will either be quite popular or much disliked. Yale’s decision not to rent 
to American Apparel may be an example of this.
324
 And 986 Chapel’s vacancy may be due to 
similar factors. Its vacancy is simply part of the status quo and thus does not create much 
controversy among Yale affiliates. But if UP were to take a chance on a tenant, and that tenant 
should prove unpopular, many Yale affiliates may notice and complain about the decision, even 
if the tenant created greater positive effects than a vacant building.
325
 
 Second, it will be easier for some in the Yale community to monitor the decisions of UP 
than others. The same groups that are likely to win in political battles over University policy are 
also likely to be the best monitors. As long-time New Haven residents, Yale faculty and 
administrators are simply in a much better position to observe what decisions UP is making and 
to criticize UP if it should make decisions harmful to their interests. The managers of a 
university’s real estate program would not be ignorant of this, and thus they may have incentives 
to err on the side of favoring the interests of the university’s most-powerful affiliate groups. The 
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agency problems of university management of commercial real estate thus are likely to 
exacerbate the inequalities of benefits produced through political processes.  
 Third, because Yale affiliates cannot objectively assess the results of Yale’s commercial 
real estate investments, the managers of Yale’s program have incentives to maximize something 
other than the affiliates’ best interests. Specifically, Yale’s managers will act to maximize 
affiliates’ perception that Yale’s program serves their interests, since it is this perception that 
ultimately shapes the continued existence of Yale’s program. Perception is not reality, however, 
particularly in cases such as this one, where Yale’s affiliates are relatively ignorant about 
commercial real estate and Yale’s actions. As a result, program administrators may be pursuing a 
very different objective than serving the best interests of Yale’s affiliates, instead trying to make 
Yale affiliates believe that University Properties is doing a lot to improve New Haven.
326
 In 
short, Yale’s real estate managers are likely maximizing “excitement” about Yale’s efforts. 
Yale’s recently announced plans to spend nearly $5 million renovating one of its properties on 
Broadway to make room for an Apple store may be an example of this.
327
 
 Finally, the managers of Yale’s program are likely to make more substantively bad 
decisions, defined as decisions that advance no one’s interest more than the alternatives. Yale’s 
management of Audubon is a good example of this.
328
 Since expanding its holdings in 2002, UP 
consistently tried to fill the district with arts-themed retailers. These businesses failed at an 
alarming rate for eight years before the University adopted a different approach. It is now 
                                                 
326 Cf. David Romer, Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football, 114 J. POL. ECON. 340 (2006) 
(noting that football coaches’ decisions on fourth down significantly diverge from decisions that would maximize 
the chances of winning, suggesting either that coaches are imperfect maximizers or that they are attempting to 
maximize something other than winning, such as fans’ impression of their team’s chance of winning throughout the 
course of the game). 
327 MacMillan, supra note 108. Perhaps this investment will produce such large increases in business for 
neighboring tenants or generate sufficient non-business externalities captured by University affiliates as to be 
justified. But $5 million is a lot of money to spend, particularly to fill a property that already had a tenant.  




focusing on service providers such as hair salons because of the area’s low foot traffic.329 Yale 
can persist in these poor policies much longer than a private developer could because it does not 
face any competition. And Yale’s affiliates are unable to discipline UP for ineffective policies 
because they are only aware of the affirmative decisions it makes, not the negative ones. Thus 
they have no means of comparing UP’s performance with how effective it could have been and 
pushing for more-beneficial policies.  
It could be argued that the above points regarding commercial real estate apply to Yale’s 
decisions more broadly. Hiring faculty and setting curriculum are not obviously more amenable 
to objective assessment of results and low-cost monitoring than are decisions on commercial real 
estate. This objection, however, ignores that Yale administrators have acquired tremendous 
experience in these areas that are central to the University’s mission. The path of University 
decisionmakers’ careers, both in different positions and between different universities, provides a 
market-like mechanism, where objectively correct results can be measured over time and 
systematically rewarded, and negative results punished. But commercial real estate is far outside 
the areas of expertise Yale administrators are ordinarily selected for. Given the novelty of 
university activity in this area, it would be somewhat surprising if systematically correct methods 
of managing university property have emerged. 
4.6 Assessing Yale’s Program Internally 
 Ultimately, it is simply impossible to develop a quantitative assessment of Yale’s 
program because of the complexity of the mechanisms involved. There is no way to look to 
objective measures of Yale’s successes and attribute gains or losses to concrete decisions about 
commercial real estate. Thus we can only render a qualitative judgment about the merits of 
Yale’s program, and given the nature of this task, reasonable people are bound to disagree. 
                                                 




 I think I have shown that Yale’s efforts have a strong theoretical foundation. Given that 
the University has made enormous investments in New Haven for its primary mission of 
education, even large money-losing secondary investments in city real estate may be efficient if 
they can produce positive externalities, such as safety or an appealing and attractive downtown, 
that are felt by the University’s affiliates. Further, it makes good sense that the University’s 
decisions will look a lot like the decisions that would be made by a private retail developer, 
because the techniques these developers use to create favorable shopping externalities are very 
likely to also generate the sort of externalities that University wishes to create. 
 The problem from Yale and its affiliates’ perspective, however, is not one of theory but 
one of practice. First, universities are highly political institutions with multiple constituencies. 
These different groups are likely to have unequal political power. And this means that university 
policies are likely to benefit those groups that can more easily advance their interests through the 
university’s political system. Second, management of commercial real estate by university 
administrators is likely to create very severe agency problems. Both of these dynamics mean that 
universities’ investments in commercial real estate could easily be inefficient, because other uses 
of the same funds would do more to advance the best interests of the university’s affiliates in 
aggregate. While political and agency problems beset the university generally, they are more 
likely to be pronounced in areas such as commercial real estate that are far outside the 
university’s traditional competence. And because programs of this sort are novel, institutional 
mechanisms have not been developed within the university to control these bad effects.
330
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a mistake for a university to simply manage its property in order to achieve the highest possible returns rather than 
to consider the secondary effects of its investments. But given that political and agency dynamics may prevent 




 What does this mean for Yale’s programs and those of other universities? I propose that, 
at least from the internal perspective of the university, these programs should be thought of as 
having an efficient size. The benefits of commercial real estate investment to a university’s 
affiliates are likely to decrease as these programs expand. On most campuses, there is likely 
some low-hanging fruit: particular properties near the university that are poorly used where 
targeted investments could produce large gains for university affiliates. Once this low-hanging 
fruit is picked, however, and universities make investments further and further from the campus, 
the total gains from additional investment are likely be lower. At the same time, the costs of 
these programs—suboptimal outcomes due to political or agency problems—likely become more 
pronounced as the scope of investments increases. This is because the gains captured by 
university affiliates from far-out investments are likely to be highly concentrated, leading to 
political dysfunction, while larger programs inevitably require more delegation of 
decisionmaking, creating higher agency costs. The efficient size for a university’s program is 
that at which the marginal benefits of expansion equal the marginal costs of expansion. 
I see Yale’s program, then, as raising many of the same issues as government investment 
in and management of real estate. While a theoretical case can be made for at least some such 
investments, the efficiency costs of turning to a non-market mechanism can be high because of 
public choice and agency issues. As these investments expand, the costs of these dysfunctions 
become higher and the theoretical justification for further investments lower. At some point, 
further investment ceases to be efficient and becomes simply a waste of resources. 
 My own take on Yale’s program is that it has likely exceeded this point. The University’s 
recent investments in Audubon seem to have been a mistake. Both the placement of these 




University’s affiliates, at least in aggregate, that justify the costs of these investments. Also 
troubling is that the University continues to be so active in Broadway and Chapel. Ten or fifteen 
years ago, when these investments were first made, these areas, particularly Broadway, looked 
like ones with some of the low-hanging fruit postulated above. But New Haven has changed in 
the meantime and become a much more-attractive downtown. A strong case could be made, then, 
that Yale should consider selling these properties or at least playing a less-active role in 
management. But large investments and extensive tenant recruitment, most recently with the 
Apple store on Broadway, has continued. Worst of all, there are some signs that the University 
may be seeking to expand its retail holdings into areas ever-further from the University.
331
 These 
points suggest that Yale’s program is increasingly being captured by more-powerful affiliate 
groups and beset by higher and higher agency costs.
332
 Given these signs of greater political and 
agency dysfunction, I think that Yale’s program has exceeded the point where this is the best use 
of Yale’s resources. Thus while some of Yale’s initial investments likely created sufficient 
positive externalities for the Yale community as a whole so as to be justified, more-recent 
investments do not appear to have created similar gains and further investments are undesirable.  
5  EVALUATING YALE’S PROGRAM FROM AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
 In this Part, I consider whether Yale’s program is good for New Haven as a whole. 
Obviously, internal assessments of Yale’s program, discussed in Part 4, are relevant to this. Yale 
is very important to New Haven’s economy, so it may be that even if the program has negative 
effects on those not affiliated with Yale, it may be a net positive for New Haven if it is 
sufficiently beneficial to Yale affiliates. Alternatively, the benefits to Yale affiliates may be 
insufficient to make up for its harms to non-affiliates. Finally, it may be that the program benefits 
                                                 
331 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
332 Self-aggrandizement, the tendency of agents to wish to expand their empires, is a well-known agency cost that I 




both affiliates and non-affiliates and is therefore universally positive.
333
 But Yale, as an 
international university, may have effects that far exceed the boundaries of the greater New 
Haven area. An external assessment thus could attempt to determine whether Yale’s program is 
beneficial more broadly. I will not attempt to do this for two reasons. First, I have no idea how to 
assess these global effects. Second, I am inclined to doubt they exist. I view elite universities as 
substitutes for each other. If the deterioration of New Haven should cause Yale to lose its place 
as an elite international university, I doubt this would diminish the state of the world in any 
appreciable sense, since the students and faculty lost by Yale would merely go to some other 
university, which would then simply replace Yale and produce the same output. 
 As should be implicit from above, I will adopt a utilitarian perspective on the question of 
whether Yale’s program is good for New Haven. The socially desirable decision is, roughly 
speaking, that which would be made if all costs and benefits of the decision for everyone were 
taken into account and correctly weighed. Thus my definition of a good policy is one that 
increases aggregate welfare, while a bad policy decreases aggregate welfare.  
 From this utilitarian, New Haven-centric perspective, two distinct criticisms can be made 
of Yale’s program. I will dub these the “conservative” and the “radical” critique. The 
conservative critique argues that Yale is simply a bad institutional form for radically 
transforming cities. Yale affiliates differ from New Haven residents in a systematic way. This 
means that some demographic groups within New Haven are either directly represented in Yale, 
by being Yale affiliates, or they are “virtually represented,”334 because those with similar 
interests are part of Yale. Other New Haven demographic groups, however, primarily lower-
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income and minority individuals, are neither part of Yale in large numbers nor do they have 
interests in common with large numbers of Yale affiliates. This results in a simple problem of 
unequal transaction costs. Some demographic groups within New Haven can easily influence 
Yale’s policies and thus internalize these policies’ effects on them, while other groups, those 
disproportionately excluded from Yale, have great difficulty internalizing the costs Yale’s 
policies may impose on them. As a result, Yale’s policies are likely to create negative 
externalities for some groups of New Haven residents. These externalities can stem either from 
general policies and priorities or from specific management decisions. Regardless, the existence 
of these inequalities in transaction costs makes Yale poorly suited to transforming New Haven 
because it will not consider the total costs imposed by its decisions but only the costs and 
benefits that fall on some New Haven residents. Serious harms of this sort have so far been 
avoided, but only because Yale’s program remains relatively small. If Yale or other universities 
should continue to expand their ambitions from simply improving the immediate vicinity of their 
campuses to drastically remaking their cities, they run the risk of repeating the mistakes of 
universities’ urban renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s, the errors of which were due in 
large part to these disparities in transaction costs.  
 The radical critique argues that universities should in fact work to transform their cities, 
but their strategies so far have been unduly influenced by the lessons of shopping centers. While 
the careful management of shopping centers does succeed in generating externalities conducive 
to shopping, it fails to create other important externalities only found in vibrant and diverse 
urban areas. On this view, university urban investment is a promising trend because universities 




But doing so will require universities to disregard many of the techniques of the shopping mall 
developer and instead invent new ones, something they have not yet tried to do. 
5.1 Inequalities in Transaction Costs 
 It should be obvious that the Yale community is not representative of New Haven. No 
representation, of course, can be perfect, or else it would not be representation at all.
335
 But in 
countless ways, New Haven residents differ meaningfully from Yale affiliates, primarily in terms 
of wealth, social class, and race. This plays out in two ways. First, some groups of New Haven 
residents are much more likely to be Yale affiliates. Second, among those New Haveners who 
are not Yale affiliates, some New Haveners are very similar to Yale affiliates and thus share 
many interests with them, while other New Haveners have less in common with Yale affiliates 
and thus lack proxies who will, by pursuing their own interests within Yale, accidentally advance 
non-affiliates’ interests. 
 Differences in how well certain groups are represented at Yale lead to inequalities in 
transaction costs. Some New Haven residents are Yale affiliates. If Yale adopts policies that 
impose costs on these residents, they can cheaply make these costs known to the University and 
influence its decisionmaking. New Haven residents who are not Yale affiliates but share interests 
with them can free ride on Yale affiliates’ efforts and similarly have their interests virtually 
represented. But New Haveners who are not Yale affiliates and do not have interests in common 
with affiliates have no such luck. If a Yale policy imposes costs on them, it is much more 
difficult for these individuals to organize, communicate their concerns, and change University 
decisions because they have no formal position within the University’s structure.  
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 From a utilitarian perspective, this presents an obvious problem. What we have here are 
unequal transaction costs. Some groups within New Haven can negotiate with Yale and shape its 
decisions more easily than others. Unequal transaction costs are a problem because they lead to 
externalities.
336
 If some groups have low transaction costs while others high ones, the costs and 
benefits for the groups with low costs will be considered more fully than the costs and benefits 
for those with high transaction costs. The policies adopted through aggregation of preferences, 
then, will be inefficient, because not all costs and benefits are included within the calculation.
337
 
And inefficient policies are undesirable.  
5.1.1 The Costs of Yale’s Program for Non-Affiliates 
 With this theoretical foundation, I can now discuss the potential problems of Yale’s 
investment in commercial real estate from the perspective of New Haven as a whole. The above 
institutional dynamic—that the transaction costs of negotiating with Yale are unequally 
distributed—is hardly unique to real estate. It applies to everything the University does. But 
investments in real estate make this issue more salient because it is quite clear how land-use can 
create externalities, whereas Yale’s educational curriculum, say, is unlikely to impose costs on a 
similar scale. While there are many costs Yale’s management of its commercial real estate could 
impose on non affiliates, two are particularly noteworthy and can be demonstrated with concrete 
examples.  
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 The first of these is harm to consumers. Businesses that do not fit Yale’s vision for a 
particular area of New Haven are put at a disadvantage versus those that do. In areas where Yale 
controls much of the desirable property, such as Broadway or Chapel, this means that such 
businesses must compete over the handful of non-Yale properties, be relegated to the less-
appealing properties within the area (these two are often the same), or be excluded from the area 
entirely. This not only harms the businesses in question, but it may harm consumers. They may 
be unable to purchase some goods at all, such as tobacco products, which are not sold anywhere 
on Broadway. Or they may face monopoly prices, since Yale retailers are protected against new 
entrants. Yale must be aware of these effects, and no may have determined that the benefits to 
Yale affiliates of its tenant selection policies exceed the costs created by restrictions on market 
entry. But because Yale considers only the costs and benefits for its affiliates, non-affiliates, 
particularly those not in a position to capture the externalities generated from Yale’s tenant 
selection policies, may be hurt by the monopolistic effects of its tenant selection.
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 These concerns are not entirely new. In the late 1960s and 1970s, there was a brief period 
of legal tumult, both in courts and among academics, regarding the antitrust and anticompetitive 
implications of shopping malls’ tenant selection policies.339 While various policies of shopping 
centers were criticized, the main area of focus was mall developers’ practice of granting anchor 
tenants such as department stores contractual veto rights over the developer’s selection of other 
tenants.
340
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and private plaintiffs attempted to have these 
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Colleges. They benefit little if at all from Yale’s tenant selection policies, but clearly are hurt by restrictions on 
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339 For a retrospective overview of the events of this period, see Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of 
Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 678-702 (1982).  
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and other provisions of shopping center leases declared per se violations of federal antitrust law, 
but federal courts refused to bite, uniformly applying a rule of reason approach and upholding as 
reasonable nearly all incidental restraints of trade from these tenant selection practices.
341
 The 
main justification for this was that even if these practices restricted competition within a 
shopping mall, malls themselves would compete with each other.
342
 
 Clearly, Yale’s practices in tenant selection do not violate antitrust laws, since, unlike the 
practices targeted by the FTC in the 1970s, they involve no contracts or conspiracies to restrain 
trade but are merely the result of Yale’s internal decisionmaking process. This does not mean, 
however, that Yale’s tenant selection policies do not restrict competition and thereby hurt some 
consumers. This is particularly so because unlike shopping malls, which are generally found in 
suburban areas where land can be cheaply acquired and new malls opened, Yale’s holdings are 
all found within the downtown core of New Haven. The supply of land available for retail space 
downtown is simply fixed and cannot be expanded. Those who wish to compete with Yale 
regarding how downtown New Haven should look have a limited ability to do so.  
 A second kind of harm is a more-straightforward externality. Here, I again will use the 
long-term vacancy of 986 Chapel as an example. It may be that Yale tolerates very costly long-
term vacancies such as this one because its affiliates do not bear the full costs of the externalities 
these vacancies create. Given the nature of its existing tenants and the demographic 
characteristics of its affiliates, Yale may be better off not filling these properties than filling them 
with a “bad” tenant.343 Furthermore, Yale tends to manage the location of tenants in such a way 
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that its vacant properties are disproportionately located at the fringes of its real estate holdings.
344
 
Together, these features of Yale’s behavior likely impose significant costs on non-affiliates. 
Since Yale’s vacant properties often border many non-Yale properties, any negative externalities 
created by a long-term vacancy are borne by non-Yale tenants.
345
 Moreover, a tenant Yale sees 
as “bad”—that is, not creating positive shopping externalities for its tenants or public goods for 
its affiliates because it appeals to demographic groups not found among its affiliates—may well 
be a “good” tenant for neighboring non-Yale tenants, since it may generate externalities that can 
be enjoyed by these neighbors and their customers. It seems quite safe to say that decade-long 
vacancies in properties facing the New Haven Green are socially undesirable and would not 
occur in a world without transaction costs. Yale, then, only tolerates this vacancy because most 
of the externalities it generates are felt by non affiliates, and these costs do not enter Yale’s 
calculus; but for these unequal transaction costs, we might expect a different result.  
We should not exaggerate the magnitude of these problems. So far, any harm to 
consumers from Yale’s policies is likely small. It is clear that at least in some cases, notably 
Gourmet Heaven on Broadway, Yale’s practices have led to artificially inflated prices,346 while 
in others, such as American Apparel,
347
 Yale has possibly refused to rent to certain tenants in 
order to protect the position of its anchor tenants. But Yale hardly owns all of downtown New 
Haven. Much retail space remains, including areas that appeal primarily to lower-income 
shoppers.
348
 And while Yale’s tolerance of long-term vacancies may harm neighboring tenants 
and their customers, the damage is confined to only a few properties. But if Yale’s program were 
                                                 
344 See supra Subsection 3.3.7.  
345 See supra note 308.  
346 See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.  
347 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  




to continue to expand, we might well expect the magnitude of the harms to non-affiliates to 
expand as well.  
5.1.2 The Parallel of Exclusionary Zoning 
 This way of looking at Yale’s program of commercial real estate, and that of universities 
generally, reveals how novel this activity is. It may be tempting at first to think of Yale’s efforts 
as simple gentrification.
349
 This analogy seriously misunderstands Yale’s motivation, however. 
Gentrification is normally seen as a market phenomenon. For exogenous reasons, such as 
improvements in the safety of a neighborhood or restraints on supply in other neighborhoods, 
demand for commercial or residential real estate within a particular area increases. Increases in 
demand without increases in supply inevitably result in higher prices, which often prices a 
neighborhood’s existing residents out of the market.  
 This is not what is happening in Yale’s case. While Yale is clearly trying to increase the 
appeal of neighborhoods around campus to wealthier demographics, it is doing so in order to 
achieve a further goal: increasing the safety, quality, etc., of these neighborhoods in order to 
benefit Yale affiliates. Yale’s program is actually a sort of reverse gentrification. Rather than 
creating exogenous factors that increase land values, Yale is using the market itself to generate 
the exogenous factors that usually drive gentrification. This, of course, may result in further 
gentrification, leading to feedback effects that increases land values even further. But seeing 
Yale as deliberately trying to increase land value through a process akin to gentrification is to 
fundamentally misunderstand what its goals are. It is using investments in real estate to create the 
sort of increases in quality that ordinarily drive gentrification, in order to benefit its affiliates and 
thereby enhance the success of its existing, illiquid investments in its primary activity. When 
university investments in real estate are viewed in this way, I think it is clear that cities have 
                                                 




never seen any institution that behaved like this before. This is a novel practice not only for 
universities, but within cities as well.  
 A better parallel may be exclusionary zoning. The more-common approach to 
exclusionary zoning sees it as a substantive wrong: residential segregation by income creates 
residential segregation by race or other characteristics, which is itself undesirable.
350
 But other 
scholars view exclusionary zoning through an institutional lens.
351
 From this perspective, the 
chief problem with the exclusionary suburb is not that the exclusion itself is harmful. Rather, 
excluding certain income groups makes the suburb demographically dissimilar to the region as a 
whole, and that means that the suburb will set policy with an eye only to how its policies will 
affect certain groups. In short, exclusionary suburbs are an institutional form that creates unequal 
transaction costs, and that will lead to inefficient policies, since significant externalities are likely 
to follow from inequalities in transaction costs.
352
 
 My account of the potential problems with Yale’s investments in New Haven closely 
mirrors this analysis of exclusionary zoning. Yale is in some ways like an exclusionary suburb, 
less because its land-use decisions exclude certain classes of individuals than because its 
institutional structure means that it will systematically disregard the costs of its policies on non-
affiliates, just as the exclusionary suburb’s political structure ensures it will disregard the costs of 
its policies on non-residents. Moreover, in both the exclusionary suburb and the university 
                                                 
350 See, e.g., John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1685, 1708-09 (1998) 
(reviewing CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996)). 
351 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265, 2278-79 (1997) (reviewing CHARLES 
HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) and DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER 
& LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)). 








 One benefit from thinking about university actions in these terms is remedies. A frequent 
pattern with exclusionary zoning is that exclusionary communities “win” at the local level with 
land-use decisions, but “lose” at a higher level, as state legislatures adopt measures to hinder 
local governments’ ability to create policies that are too exclusionary.354 This should not be 
surprising. Since higher levels of government are more representative of society as a whole than 
highly homogeneous local communities, they may doubt the decisionmaking process of these 
communities, prompting them to adopt measures that deter actions that may be influenced by the 
costs and benefits of only a narrow group. In essence, as exclusionary zoning has become more 
prevalent, state legislatures and courts have created new counter institutions to internalize the 
externalities exclusionary communities may create through policies arrived at from unequal 
transaction costs.  
Here is where the university differs. As discussed above, university investment in urban 
real estate is a new phenomenon, and the purposes for which universities make these investments 
are unlike the purposes of any other real estate developer. This is simply a new type of actor on 
the urban scene, with motivations completely different from all other participants. Because of the 
novelty of this form, no other institutions have yet emerged to counter the potentially destructive 
effects of the university’s unequal transaction costs. It may be that as universities become more 
ambitious with their real estate programs, and possibly create greater externalities for non-
affiliates, other institutions will arise to counter this imbalance. But this has not yet occurred.  
                                                 
353 From a distributive justice framework, the fact that these costs fall so heavily on poorer individuals is a further 
problem.  
354 For an overview of state and regional controls of exclusionary zoning, see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 72, at 
783-85; and STUART MECK, REBECCA RETZLAFF & JAMES SCHWAB, REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE 




5.1.3 The Parallel of Urban Renewal 
 Viewing the problems of Yale’s present program through this institutional lens sheds a 
great deal of light on universities’ involvement in urban renewal during the 1950s and 1960s. 
While university administrators and planners tend to see the failures of that period as due to poor 
methods and poor internal procedures,
355
 from the institutional perspective, these failures look 
inevitable. Universities are simply not institutions that are well equipped to remaking cities, 
particularly cities inhabited by large numbers of residents who have different interests from the 
university and its affiliates. The University of Chicago’s urban renewal efforts in Hyde Park, for 
example, failed in large part because the University’s structure necessarily creates unequal 
transaction costs, and that will lead to significant externalities imposed on non-affiliates. The 
backlash against university development following urban renewal was nothing more than the 
emergence of counter institutions to internalize on universities the costs their policies imposed 
on non-affiliates. While universities may have taken steps to ensure greater community 
involvement in their land-use planning decisions since the days of urban renewal, such measures 
only reduce the disparity in transaction costs. These inequalities can never be entirely eliminated 
since they are inherent in the structure of a university, and that makes universities fundamentally 
unsound actors for remaking cities.  
 Yale and other universities have so far avoided repeating the mistakes of the past largely 
because their ambitions have not yet reached the scale of their predecessors’ during urban 
renewal. This may not last, however. While Yale has not yet adopted aggressive policies that 
impose large costs on outsiders, its efforts to remake New Haven are ongoing and if anything 
expanding. If this trend continues, we might well expect a repeat of the mid century, as the 
                                                 




university’s basic form makes it inevitable that it will adopt inefficient policies leading to 
backlash.  
5.4 Nostalgia 
 There is another, very different critique that could be made of these modern university 
development practices, including those of Yale. Taken to their logical conclusion, the application 
of modern shopping center development practices to cities would result in a pattern of land use 
with many small, highly specialized, but internally homogeneous neighborhoods. Each 
neighborhood would target a particular demographic to the exclusion of establishments that 
appeal to others. Such an approach would best capture the shopping externalities generated by 
retail and ensure higher revenues, perhaps allowing urban retail to compete favorably with the 
suburbs. There would still be a great deal of diversity between neighborhoods, but very little 
within them. This stands in contrast with a more-traditional model of urban places, in which 
urban land uses are diverse at both a neighborhood and at a micro level. Neighborhoods have 
recognizable differences, but within each part of town there is a little something for everyone as 
opposed to a fine-grained homogeneity targeting a particular demographic.
356
  
The prospect of cities that look like a series of extensively planned shopping centers, 
each appealing to a slightly different crowd, no doubt fills many fans of urban places with a 
certain gloom. For them, one of the chief virtues of cities is their vibrancy and variety on the 
block level. Such a pattern is in large part the result of fractured ownership and the high costs of 
land assembly, which ensure that externalities within cities often remain externalities. But the 
failure of urban landowners to capture and price all the positive and negative business 
externalities created by their properties may well create its own unique set of externalities: a 
                                                 
356 Clearly, diversity among neighborhoods is only possible to the extent that there is some absence of diversity 




certain urban way of life. Suburban developers intent on capturing every possible shopping 
externality inevitably must forego these, for this latter set of externalities is enjoyed as broadly as 
possible, and thus the transaction costs of bargaining to achieve them are prohibitively high.  
 This critique points in one of two directions. On the one hand, those who fear this micro-
homogenization of cities may be tempted to view the university as a savior. Universities may be 
the only major urban actors with the resources, expertise, and incentives to simply ignore these 
business realities and create the urban vitality externalities that make cities enjoyable. On this 
view, Yale acts far too much like a profit-driven developer. The externalities targeted by 
shopping center developers are not the only type that can be created from a successful shopping 
district. Yale has been unduly influenced by the lessons of these shopping centers and instead 
should focus on how its decisions do or can affect and improve the City of New Haven and the 
University community as a whole in a much broader way. While this may sound at first 
appealing, it is unlikely to play out as hoped. For this view asks universities to play a much 
more-active and novel, even altruistic, role, subsidizing all sorts of land uses that are seen as 
attractive. This strategy, combined with their institutional structure, would most likely result in 
universities pursuing the interests of a narrow few—their affiliates—even more aggressively, 
imposing significant costs on non-affiliates. After all, it may be that this sophisticated argument 
for cities is nothing more than the aesthetic tastes of a certain class of educated urbanites. 
 The other way this critique may go is toward a kind of sad nostalgia. For on this view, the 
vibrancy externalities generated by many urban places in their heyday were merely a historical 
anomaly caused by certain features of the urban economy. So long as no institution existed that 
could capture shopping externalities and the like, cities maintained their exciting variety. But the 




created that could capture the huge shopping externalities generated by central-city department 
stores, externalities that had done much to sustain the health of central business districts.
357
 Once 
the shopping mall was established, the days of the central business district were limited, since 
suburban mall developers could finally subsidize these spillover generators for the external 
benefits they created. Offered lower rent, they departed for the suburbs. Once there, the smaller 
retailers who had long enjoyed success as free riders could either struggle on without them or 
follow them to the suburban fringe. A world where no institutional form exists to capture these 
externalities is unlikely to return anytime soon. Thus cities today face two bad choices: either 
continue to exist in the shadow of suburban retail or copy the development strategies of the 
suburb and tolerate the unpleasant homogeneity and loss of diversity that it inevitably brings. 
 The university, on this view, is one of the few institutions capable of possibly breaking 
central cities out of this trade off. Universities are enormous generators of public goods, through 
for example university police forces, and create many positive externalities of their own as major 
employers and cultural centers. The university’s appropriate role in the modern city, then, is not 
to copy suburban developers but simply to generate these public goods and externalities, letting 
the rest of the city be. Instead of attempting to micromanage urban development, universities 
should be content to focus on their core competencies, education and research, perhaps with a 
few public goods such as safety thrown in, and leave to private forces decisions about how to use 
and manage the city’s commercial real estate. This role too sees universities as somewhat 
altruistic, providing public benefits on which non-affiliates can free ride, but this approach may 
well be more sustainable, as it may benefit university affiliates just as much as active 
management. For while it requires universities to forego whatever externalities may be generated 
by homogenous shopping districts, turning their resources toward their primary activities may 
                                                 




not only be more efficient from the university’s perspective, it may well produce greater benefits 
for the city, as it provides a sort of externality the suburbs can never hope to match.  
CONCLUSION 
 Yale’s program of commercial real estate investment, like those at other urban 
universities, is a new type of actor in urban areas. It relies on the same techniques successful 
shopping center developers use to make business decisions. But unlike ordinary shopping center 
developers, who use these considerations to maximize the value of the center by increasing sales, 
Yale uses these insights primarily to generate certain positive externalities, such as safety, that 
are enjoyed by its affiliates both as students and employees of Yale and as residents of New 
Haven. While the theory behind this effort is sound and the University has clearly succeeded in 
generating many of these positive effects, the complicated structure of the University makes this 
a difficult goal to achieve without substantial inefficiencies. Yale’s policies have been distorted 
to suit the interests of its more-powerful affiliate groups, and the agency costs of its program are 
very high. While the program as a whole has undoubtedly benefited Yale’s affiliates, recent 
expansions of its investments have been disappointing and future growth in the program is likely 
to be increasingly detrimental to affiliates’ aggregate interests in comparison with alternative 
uses of the same resources.   
 The assessment is similar if Yale’s efforts are viewed from the perspective of New Haven 
as a whole. The missteps of the bad-old-days of urban renewal were not merely the result of poor 
theories of urban places but also were caused by the institutional limitations of the university. 
The more aggressive universities become in trying to remake central cities, the greater the risk 
that their decisions will significantly depart from what is socially optimal by imposing large 




decisions impose such costs on non-affiliates, but given the small size of New Haven and the 
current magnitude of Yale’s efforts, it is perhaps closer to this line than any other university.  
 Finally, there is some room for questioning whether universities’ use of the techniques of 
shopping center developers is good for cities. It may well be that the features of cities many 
people prize were largely the result of institutional forms that mispriced public goods such as 
shopping spillovers. But this failure to capture one set of externalities may have allowed them to 
create other positive externalities, such as vibrancy and diversity. While this view is not without 
a certain appeal, these accidental benefits may be gone for good, a casualty of suburbanization 
and changes in institutions. It may be too easy to reject this view as nostalgia, however, as if 
taken seriously, it may have something very different to say about how urban universities should 
behave. For on this view, the great virtue of universities is that they remain perhaps the greatest 
public-good generator remaining in urban places, something for which the suburbs have no 
counterpart. Sound investments in the university’s primary activities, and those few secondary 
activities it can manage without sacrificing large efficiency gains, may do much more to benefit 
both cities and universities’ affiliates over the long-term than these recent experiments with areas 
outside of universities’ core competencies, such as real estate.   
 
APPENDIX: A LIST OF YALE’S DOWNTOWN COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES 
Broadway District 
264 York Street 
Acquired 1973,
358




                                                 
358 All dates of acquisition come from the New Haven Tax Assessor’s Online Database. ASSESSORS ONLINE 
DATABASE FOR NEW HAVEN, CT, http://data.visionappraisal.com/NewHavenCT/DEFAULT.asp (last visited Mar. 
11, 2011). 





266 York Street 
Acquired 1973, currently occupied by Gant 
 
282 York Street 
Acquired 1992, currently occupied by Blue State and Ashley’s Ice Cream, with a vacant space 
 
296 Elm Street 
Date of acquisition unknown, currently occupied by Trailblazer 
 
310 Elm Street 
Attached to one of the Yale colleges, currently vacant 
 
316 Elm Street 





 currently occupied by Au Bon Pain, Origins, and Denali 
 
15 Broadway 



















Date of acquisition unknown, currently occupied by Barnes & Noble 
 
Notable non-Yale Properties 
21 Broadway, owned by Mortgage Investors I LLC, current tenant A-One Pizza 
 
51 and 57 Broadway, owned by Yale Mall Partnership, currently occupied by American Apparel,  
Blue Jay’s Cleaners, Educated Burgher, and Campus Customs 
 
260 York street, owned by J. Press, current tenant J. Press 
                                                 
360 This date may be the result of renovation, which changed the layout of the property.  
361 This date may be the result of renovation, which changed the layout of the property. 
362 This date certainly the result of renovation. Actual date of acquisition unknown.  






290 York Street, owned by A&G Realtor Ass’n, current tenants Labyrinth Books and Yorkside 
 






 currently occupied by J&B Deli and a vacant space 
 
1126 Chapel 





Attached to the School of Architecture,
366
 currently occupied by Willoughby’s Coffee 
 
1074 Chapel 
Attached to the Yale British Art Gallery, currently occupied by Scoozi, Derek Simpson  
Goldsmith, Hello Boutique, Atticus, and Froyo World 
 
1042 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Wave Gallery, Tracy B, and other tenants 
 
1032 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Union League Café and other tenants 
 
1022 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Seychelles, Raggs, and other tenants 
 
1016 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Idiom and Basta 
 
1002 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Celtica and Claire’s Corner Copia 
 
986 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently vacant 
 
976 Chapel 
Acquired 1999, currently vacant 
 
                                                 
364 The Schiavone buildings are listed in the Tax Assessor’s database as being purchased in 1999 by the “Chapel 
Company.” In 2004, these properties were all transferred to Yale’s name. I assume that the Chapel Company was 
merely a corporate entity controlled by the University.  
365 Elm Campus Partners’ offices are on the upper floors of this building.  










Acquired 1999, a parking lot 
 
220 College 
Acquired 1999, currently occupied by Pacifico, Samurai, and Oaxaca Kitchen 
 
255 Crown 
Acquired 1999, vacant land (possibly used as a parking lot) 
 
265 Crown 
Acquired 1999, vacant land (possibly used as a parking lot) 
 
Notable non-Yale Properties 
1066 Chapel, owned by Chapel Investment LLC, currently occupied by Starbucks 
 
1048 Chapel, owned by Chapel Investment LLC, currently occupied by Enson’s, News Haven,  
Savitt Jewelers, Allegra Printing, Merwin’s Art Shop, and Ten Thousand Villages 
 
265 College, owned by Taft Intermediate LLC, currently occupied by Archetype, Karma, and  
Downtown at the Taft on College Street and by Richter’s on Chapel 
 
268 College, owned by 268 College LLC, currently occupied by Anchor and the Owl Shop 
 
266 College, owned by Ravada Enterprises LLC, currently occupied by Bespoke 
 
238 College, owned by 238 College Street LLC, currently occupied by several tenants, including  
College Street Cycles and Greg’s Tailor Shop 
 
Audubon/Whitney 
2 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 1997, office space only, no retail 
 
40 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 1972, used as a parking lot 
 
44 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 1972, currently occupied by Gourmet Heaven and Moe’s 
 
58 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 1986, currently occupied by Katahdin Furniture 
 
                                                 




68 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 1986, currently occupied by Clark’s Dairy 
 
72 Whitney Ave 




55 Whitney Avenue 
Acquired 2002, houses several tenants as well as vacant space 
 
95 Audubon Avenue 
Acquired 2002, houses several tenants as well as vacant space 
 
Notable non-Yale Properties 
48 Whitney Avenue, owned by Toto LLC, currently occupied by Subway 
 
52 Whitney Avenue, owned by TFAC LLC, currently occupied by Dunkin’ Donuts 
 
67 Whitney Avenue, owned by Guo’s Whitney Realty LLC, currently occupied by Hong Kong  
Grocery 
 
102 Audubon, owned by FDRL2 LLC, currently occupied by Koffee? 
 
Other Downtown Properties 
90 Wall Street 
Acquired 1968, currently occupied by Naples Wall Street Pizza 
 
86 Wall Street 
Acquired 1972, currently occupied by Blue State 
 
84 Wall Street 
Acquired 1968, currently occupied by Blue State
369
 and Phil’s Hair Styles 
 
150 York Street 
Acquired 1996, vacant retail space on the ground floor of the Chapel-York Garage 
 
67-81 Howe 
Date of acquisition unknown, vacant retail space on the ground floor of Howe Street Garage 
                                                 
368 This vacant space used to house Clark’s Dairy, which has since moved next door. 
369 Blue State spans both 86 and part of 84 Wall Street. 
